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ARTICLES

Virtual Witness Confrontation in
Criminal Cases: A Proposal to Use
Videoconferencing Technology in
Maritime Piracy Trials
Yvonne M. Dutton*

ABSTRACT

Maritime piracy is a serious problem, yet states are not
prosecuting captured pirates with any regularity. One of the
many reasons cited to explain this phenomenon focuses on the
expense and difficulty of mounting cases of such international
proportions and which involve evidence, suspects, victims, and
witnesses from around the globe. In an effort to help close the
impunity gap that surrounds piracy, this Article offers a
potential solution to the difficulties associated with obtaining
live witness testimony. It proposes a rule to allow witnesses
under some circumstances to testify remotely by way of two-way,
live videoconferencing technology. While remote testimony need
not become the norm in maritime piracy cases, the proposed rule
is carefully structured to balance both the public's and the
defendant's interest in a fair trial.

* Associate Professor, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Advancements in technology have now made it possible for
courts around the globe to secure the testimony of witnesses
remotely. Through two-way, live videoconferencing technology (VCT),
a witness's image and voice can be transmitted from any location in
the world to the courtroom where the trial is taking place. 1 The
benefits of using such technology can obviously be significant in
circumstances where witnesses would have to travel great distances
at great cost and at great inconvenience, while also risking their
health or safety, to testify live at a trial. When seeking the testimony
of foreign witnesses who are beyond the subpoena power of the court,
the promise of remote testimony may be the only way to obtain that
2
witness's cooperation and evidence.
Notwithstanding that many commentators and courts seem to
embrace the benefits of remote witness testimony in civil cases, 3 not
all agree on the propriety of allowing prosecution witnesses to testify
by two-way, live VCT against defendants in criminal trials. The
arguments against remote testimony in criminal trials include the

1.
See Fredric I. Lederer, The Potential Use of Courtroom Technology in Major
Terrorism Cases, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 887, 907 (2004) [hereinafter Lederer,
Courtroom Technology] (describing videoconferencing equipment and its increasing use
in courtrooms); Fredric 1. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom?A Consideration
of Today's-And Tomorrow's-High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REv. 799, 802
(1999) [hereinafter Lederer, Virtual Courtroom] ("Given that judges, counsel, and
witnesses need not be in the same location, there is a real possibility of trials in which
no physical commonality is present.").
2.
See Lynn Helland, Remote Testimony-A Prosecutor's Perspective, 35 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 719, 725 (2002) (stating that, from the author's perspective as a
federal prosecutor for twenty years, although citizens of foreign countries will refuse to
travel to the United States to testify, many have indicated they would be willing to
accommodate less burdensome requests).
3.
See Lederer, Courtroom Technology, supra note 1, at 906-07 (stating that
remote witness testimony has been used in civil cases in both the United States and
abroad); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (authorizing the use of VCT in civil cases "[flor
good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards").
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following: remote testimony may violate the defendant's right to be
confronted with the evidence against him because the testimony is
not "face-to-face"; 4 remote testimony cannot ensure truthfulness to
the same extent as requiring the witness to testify live before the
defendant; 5 and remote testimony does not provide the court and jury
with the same opportunity as does live testimony to assess the
demeanor and truthfulness of the witness. 6 On the other hand, a
number of courts have concluded that the "interests of justice" and
other exceptional circumstances justify allowing some witnesses to
testify remotely against defendants in criminal cases. Various
international criminal courts have permitted two-way, live VCT in
some cases when the witness would otherwise be unwilling or unable
to attend a trial in person because of safety, health, or work-related
concerns. 7 In addition, although courts in the United States generally
seem wary of allowing remote testimony in criminal trials, some have
allowed adult witnesses to testify via two-way, live VCT under
circumstances in which the witness would not otherwise be willing or
able to appear at the trial because of safety or health concerns, or
8
because they were beyond the court's subpoena power.

4.
See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Remote Testimony, 35 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 695, 701-08 (2002) (discussing the Confrontation Clause implications of
allowing remote witness testimony against defendants in criminal cases).
5.
See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F,3d 548, 554 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The
Constitution favors face-to-face confrontations to reduce the likelihood that a witness
will lie.").
6.
Fredric Lederer, The Legality and Practicality of Remote Witness
Testimony, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Sept. 2009, at 19, 27 (noting the concern that remote
testimony may impede the fact finder's ability to observe and determine the witness's
demeanor).
7.
See Riley A. Williams, Videoconferencing: Not a Foreign Language to
International Courts, 7 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 54 (2011) ("Through videoconferencing,
unavailable witnesses can be transmitted into courtrooms."); see also, e.g., INT'L CRIM.
CT. R. P. & EVID., available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NRrdonlyres/F1EOAC1C-A3F34A3C-B9A7-B3E8Bl 15E886/140164/Rules-of procedure-andEvidenceEnglish.pdf
(providing in Rule 67 that the court may allow a witness to give audio or video
testimony, provided the technology allows the witness to be examined by all parties at
the time the witness testifies); SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE R. P. & EVID., availableat
(providing
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yNjqn5TIYKs%3d&tabid=176
in Rule 85D for video testimony at the order of the trial court); Int'l Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Feb. 11, 1994) [hereinafter ICTY RPE], reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
484 (1994) (providing in Rule 81 bis that proceedings may be conducted by
videoconference link if consistent with the interests of justice).
8.
See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 79-82 (2d Cir. 1999)
(finding no Confrontation Clause violation where the trial court allowed a witness in an
organized-crime case to testify from a remote location since the witness's health
prevented him from traveling and the defendant's health also prevented him from
traveling to a distant location to depose the witness); Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364,
1367-70 (Fla. 1998) (affirming decision to allow two Argentine nationals living in
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This Article proposes a rule for use in maritime piracy cases that
would allow witnesses under some circumstances to testify remotely
by way of two-way, live VCT so as to better facilitate the prosecution
of those cases. Maritime piracy is the oldest crime over which states
can exercise universal jurisdiction. 9 Most states are also parties to
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which codifies
piracy's status as a universal-jurisdiction crime.10 Yet, even as pirate
attacks continue to rise in number and severity, 1 ' pirates face little
risk that they will be prosecuted and punished for their crimes.
Instead of prosecuting pirates, for the most part, the world
12
community has been content to simply release them.
One reason offered to explain this reluctance to prosecute focuses
on the expense and difficulty of mounting cases of such international
proportions and which involve evidence, suspects, victims, and
witnesses from around the globe. 13 If live witness testimony is

Argentina to testify remotely by live satellite video against the defendant in a case
charging him with robbing the two Argentines while they were on vacation in Miami
because, among other things, the witnesses lived beyond the subpoena power of the
court).
See Miriam Cohen, The Analogy Between Piracy and Human Trafficking: A
9.
Theoretical Framework for the Application of Universal Jurisdiction, 16 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 201, 201 (2010) (noting that the doctrine of universal jurisdiction was
developed to address piracy that occurred on the high seas).
10.
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOSI; Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions
and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements, UNITED NATIONS
SEA, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/referencefiles/
DIVISION FOR OcEAN AFF. & L.
chronological lists-of ratifications.htm (last updated Oct. 4, 2012). The United States is
not a party to UNCLOS; however, it ratified an earlier version of the treaty with
identical provisions regarding piracy. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (discussing and defining piracy).
11.
According to the international Maritime Bureau (IMB), the number of
reported yearly pirate attacks in 2011 was almost double the number reported in 2007,
and most attacks now involve the use of weapons. See Int'l Chamber of Commerce
International Maritime Bureau Rep, Jan. 1-Dec. 13, 2011, Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships, at 5, 10 (2011) [hereinafter ICC-IMB 2011 Report] (reporting 263 actual
and attempted attacks in 2007 compared to 445 in 2011). The IMB includes in its
annual report acts of piracy and acts of armed robbery against ships, as well as
attempts of the same. The IMB's definition of piracy includes illegal acts of violence
against a ship travelling on the high seas or any act of inciting the same. Id. at 3. Its
definition of armed robbery against ships includes acts of violence-or any act of
inciting an act of violence-against a ship located "within a State's internal waters,
archipelagic waters and territorial sea." Id.
12.
See, e.g., U.N. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, Rep. of the Special
Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, 43, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan. 24, 2011) (by Jack Lang) [hereinafter Lang]
(reporting that nine out of ten pirates captured by the world's navies are not
prosecuted).
13.
See James Kraska, Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden
and the Red Sea, 28 COMP. STRATEGY 197, 207 (2009) (describing the logistical
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required, those expenses can be particularly substantial since the
state would have to pay the costs of transporting witnesses who
reside in different parts of the world to the trial. Obtaining live
testimony is not only difficult from a cost perspective, however. States
may not be able to compel nonnationals to attend a trial in person.
States also may not be able to entice witnesses to attend if they are
ill, working at sea, or concerned for their safety-which can be the
case with crew members who have survived an attack or naval
officers who have assisted in capturing pirates during an attack.
Indeed, in his January 2011 report, the Special Adviser to the
Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Horn of
Africa, Mr. Jack Lang, noted that the requirement of in-person
testimony was proving to be an obstacle to swift trials "either because
the victims do not wish to go to lengths to give evidence, are afraid, or
' '14
their employers may not allow them to testify.
Allowing the state to produce some witnesses remotely under
certain circumstances can alleviate some of the difficulties of
obtaining the evidence necessary to successfully prosecute maritime
pirates while at the same time furthering the interests of justice. This
Article proposes that courts allow prosecution witnesses to testify by
two-way, live VCT in maritime cases on a case-by-case basis in the
interests of justice, upon proof by the requesting party that (1) the
testimony is necessary to the fair and just resolution of the case, (2)
the witness is unable or unwilling for good reason to travel to the
court to testify in person, and (3) the transmission will use
appropriate safeguards to protect the defendant's rights to a fair trial
and to ensure that the witness understands the obligation to testify
truthfully. This test balances the interests of the various parties to
the proceeding and also ensures that the trial can proceed with the
evidence needed to resolve criminal matters fairly, justly, and
expeditiously. The state would not lose valuable witness testimony;
would not have to pay great sums for witness travel; and could try
cases more swiftly, without the need to accommodate witness travel
schedules. Witnesses would be spared the inconvenience of traveling
great distances, at a cost to their health, safety, or job security.
Defendants' rights to a fair trial are also protected when witnesses
testify remotely using two-way, live VCT: witnesses will have to
confront defendants with their testimony; defendants and witnesses
will be able to view each other; the defendant will be able to subject
witnesses to contemporaneous cross-examination during the trial;
and the court and any jury will still be able to see the witness, hear

difficulties associated with prosecuting pirates because the cases can involve ships,
cargo, victims, witnesses, and suspects from a host of different countries).
14.
Lang, supra note 12, 61.
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the testimony, and assess witness credibility. Defendants can even
benefit from a rule that allows some witnesses to testify remotely
because trials can proceed and be resolved more swiftly without
requiring defendants to linger in custody awaiting their day in court.
While it need not become the norm, allowing witnesses to testify
remotely in maritime piracy trials under some circumstances would
further the interests of justice and also prompt more states to
embrace their duty to prosecute pirates instead of simply releasing
them.
Part II of this Article discusses the technology of two-way, live
VCT and some of its perceived advantages and disadvantages. Part
III examines several approaches used to analyze the issue of whether
to admit two-way, live VCT witness testimony against defendants in
criminal cases. Specifically, this Part examines the rules and
decisions of various international criminal courts, focusing on their
reasons for allowing or denying remote prosecution-witness testimony
in particular circumstances. With that same focus, this Part also
examines the law in the federal courts of the United States as it
relates to remote prosecution-witness testimony in criminal trials.
Part TV follows with a description of the modern piracy problem, the
international law governing the crime of maritime piracy, and the
need to further encourage states to use the available laws to
prosecute pirates, instead of releasing them and allowing them to
continue their illegal activities. In Part V, this Article discusses the
proposed rule for allowing prosecution witnesses to testify remotely in
maritime piracy trials by way of two-way, live VCT under some
circumstances in the interest of justice.

Ii. TwO-WAY, LIVE

VIDEOCONFERENCING TECHNOLOGY (VCT)

Two-way, live VCT permits witnesses to testify remotely in
courtrooms around the world from any location, as long as both
locations are equipped with the necessary technology. That
technology relies on point-to-point data connections between
locations, which must house a camera, a microphone, screens to
display 15
visual images, and the videoconferencing hardware (the
"codec"). In order to transmit images and sound, the equipment on

15.
See Lederer, supra note 6, at 20 (describing the required equipment for
standard videoconferencing). Professor Frederic Lederer is Chancellor Professor of Law
and Director of the Center for Legal and Court Technology at the William and Mary
Law School. For many years, he has been involved with the law school's hightechnology courtroom, the McGlothlin Courtroom. FredricLederer, WILLIAM & MARY L.
SCH., http://web.wm.edullaw/faculty/bios/fulltime/lederer-46.php?svr=law
(last visited
Oct. 20, 2012).
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each end must be connected to an Integrated Services Digital
Network (ISDN), which relies on something similar to highbandwidth telephone lines, or an Internet Protocol (IP). 16 Two-way,
live VCT transmits high-quality video images that are fully
synchronized with audio from one location to the other
simultaneously. 17
Most videoconferencing today is increasingly delivered via the IP
mode and it can be effectively free as long as the court or other
location has an internet connection.18 "ISDN-based videoconferencing
requires specialized communications lines" and will require a per-call
charge in addition to any monthly subscription cost for the line. 19
While both methods can produce clear images and voice-especially
when using newly available high-definition technology-the IP-based
method can potentially encounter some interference if bandwidth is
being used by others during the witness's remote testimony. ISDNbased methods will be more reliable in this regard, but more
20
expensive.
Worth noting is that the technology is ever-improving and
becoming increasingly affordable. 2 1 The ability to produce
videoconferencing images in high definition is one recent innovation
mentioned above. Other innovations include the ability to
concurrently transmit digital documents on one screen while the
video image is being displayed on another.2 2 Also, while
videoconferencing systems have typically used flat-panel televisions
to display content, some manufacturers have developed desktop
monitors with high-definition features. 23 More sophisticated systems
include remote controls to allow "zooming" or "panning" functionality
and some have screen options that allow the display of multiple views
of the courtroom or participants. 24 Quite recent features of newer
VCT systems use cameras that will track courtroom participants
wearing a unique "badge" that signals the camera to follow their
25
movements.

16.
Lederer, supra note 6, at 20.
17.
Id.
18.
Id. at 21.
19.
Id.
20.
See id. ("ISDN tends to give a more dependable connection but is being
increasingly abandoned in favor of the less expensive IP method of connection.").
21.
See Williams, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing evolving technoiogy in the
courtroom).
22.
See Lederer, supra note 6, at 20 ("High-end videoconferencing equipment
permits the concurrent transmission of computer images.").
23.
See id. at 21 (describing the various types of monitors used in courtrooms).
24.
See Williams, supra note 7, at 3 (noting various aspects of advanced
videoconferencing systems).
25.
See id. (discussing the features and functionality of the "badges").
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Experiments with VCT remote witness testimony at William and
Mary Law School's high-technology McGlothlin Courtroom, moreover,
indicate that while the technology cannot exactly replicate the
situation of live, face-to-face witness testimony in the courtroom, it
can come quite close. In that courtroom, the technology can display a
witness's image directly behind the witness stand, a judge's image
directly behind the bench, and counsels' images at counsel tables.
That technology also permits remote witnesses to see different views
of the courtroom and speakers. 26 Furthermore, the results of some
controlled experiments and anecdotal evidence indicate that jurors
tend to perceive remote witnesses very similarly to how they perceive
witnesses who testify live in the courtroom. 2 7 Indeed, Professor
Fredric Lederer suggests that as the technology continues to improve,
image and voice quality may become so good that one may have
28
difficulty observing that a remote witness is not physically present.
Judges also seem to be increasingly comfortable using VCT in a
variety of proceedings that previously would have required all
participants to appear together in the same room. International
criminal tribunals, especially the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), have successfully used VCT for remote
witness testimony. 29 Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Singapore all permit remote VCT witness testimony in some
circumstances. 30 In the United States, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 43(a) authorizes using remote witness testimony during

26.
See Lederer, Courtroom Technology, supra note 1, at 908 (noting the ability
of a remote witness to see either a single camera image or multiple images of William
and Mary Law School's McGlothlin Courtroom).
27.
See id. ("[]emote appearances appear to he treated by the courtroom
participants just as if those persons were physically in the courtroom.").
28.
Lederer, supra note 6, at 29.
29.
See, e.g., Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 286 (2001) (noting that
the ICTY allowed eleven witnesses in the Prosecutorv. Tadic case to testify remotely
from a location in the former Yugoslavia); see also Williams, supra note 7, at 11-13
(discussing the standards for using remote witness testimony in the ICTY and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)).
30.
See Jeremy Barnett, The United Kingdom, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
687, 690 (2004) (stating that courts in the United Kingdom use VCT to allow child and
foreign witnesses to testify in certain kinds of criminal cases); Julian Borkowski, Court
Technology in Canada, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 681, 682 (2004) (reporting that in
Canada, courts use VCT in various civil and criminal matters); Ros Macdonald & Anne
Wallace, Review of the Extent of Courtroom Technology in Australia, 12 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 649, 650 (2004) (stating that courts in Australia began using VCT to allow
vulnerable witnesses to testify in remote locations removed from the courtroom);
Richard Magnus, The Confluence of Law and Policy in Leveraging Technology:
Singapore Judiciary's Experience, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661, 663-64 (2004)
(explaining that VCT is used in many types of court proceedings in Singapore, such as
bail hearings, pretrial conferences, civil trials, and criminal trials, for specified offenses
to allow vulnerable witnesses to testify remotely).
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civil trials "in compelling circumstances and with appropriate
safeguards."'' l Federal appellate court judges have used VCT to
32
conduct oral arguments.
Of course, even if many courts are comfortable using VCT and
conclude that its use is practical and proper in certain instances, it
does not necessarily follow that remote prosecution-witness testimony
should become the norm in criminal cases in the United States or
elsewhere. Criminal cases are a unique category of proceedings that
can result in a defendant losing his freedom if convicted. Thus,
commentators and courts are right to advocate that limitations be
placed on the ability to use remote prosecution-witness testimony.
They are also right to advocate that the remote experience be as
similar as possible to the live experience for both the witness and the
individuals in the courtroom. With these concerns in mind, Part III
below discusses some approaches used by various international
criminal courts and by federal courts in the United States to analyze
the question of when to admit two-way, live VCT witness testimony
against defendants in criminal cases.

III. SOME APPROACHES USED TO ANALYZE WHEN TO ALLOW
PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO TESTIFY BY TwO-WAY, LIVE VCT IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
A. Remote VCT Prosecution Testimony in
InternationalCriminalCourts
The international criminal courts generally seem to look
favoribly on the use of two-way, live VCT prosecution witness
testimony, at least under some circumstances in which witnesses
with necessary or useful evidence would otherwise be unable or
unwilling to testify in person. For example, the ICTY, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the International Criminal Court
(ICC) all have procedural rules permitting witnesses to testify
remotely in certain situations.3 3 Although the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has no specific procedural rule

31.
FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
32.
See Advantages of Videoconferencing Grow with Use, U.S. CTS. (Aug. 2006)
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch06-08-Ol/Advantages-of_

VideoconferencingGrow withUse.aspx (describing a recent Federal Judicial Center
report surveying appellate court judges and their use of videoconferencing).
33.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Rule 81 bis was adopted to replace
Rule 71 bis on July 12, 2007, to allow for greater use of testimony by VCT. See Rules of
Procedureand Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sectionslLegalLibrarylRulesofProcedureandEvidence
(last
visited Oct. 20, 2012).
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addressing VCT witness testimony, the tribunal has granted some
requests to allow witnesses to testify remotely when 'necessary to
34
safeguard the witness's security' or in the interest of justice."
1.

The International
35
Yugoslavia

Criminal

Tribunal

for

the

Former

The ICTY allows remote testimony pursuant to Rule 81 bis of its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence if such testimony is consistent with
the interests of justice. 36 Although Rule 81 bis itself does not define
the interests of justice, a review of the Tribunal's decisions provides
guidance on what is required to satisfy that standard. Specifically,
the ICTY will only allow VCT witness testimony when the moving
party shows that (1) "the witness is unable, or has good reasons to be
unwilling," to come to the court; (2) the testimony is "sufficiently
important to make it unfair to the requesting party to proceed
without it"; and (3) the accused will "not be prejudiced in the exercise
of his or her right to confront the witness. '37 Thus, the ICTY interests
of justice test balances the witness's needs with those of the parties to
the trial process: it ensures the parties can present the evidence

34.
Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55C-T, Decision on
Prosecutor's Extremely Urgent Motion for Testimony via Video-Link,
5 (Feb. 14,
2011).
35.
In 1993, the United Nations established the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 to
preside over trials against those who had committed atrocities and crimes against
humanity during the armed conflict in the Balkans. See generally PAUL R. WILLIAMS &
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE?: WAR CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 98-101 (2002) ("[I]n February 1993, the War Crimes Commission

joined a growing international chorus publicly calling for the creation of a Nuremberglike tribunal to try persons believed to be responsible for atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia.").
36.
ICTY RPE, supra note 7.
37.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. KaradHi6, Case No. IT.95-5/18-T, Decision on
Prosecution's Motion for Testimony To Be Heard via Video-Conference Link,
5-6
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 17, 2010); Prosecutor v. Stanigi6,
Case No. IT-03-69-T, Decision on Prosecution Motions To Hear Witnesses by VideoConference Link,
8 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 24, 2010);
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Reasons for Decision Granting
Prosecution's Motion To Cross-Examine Four Proposed Rule 92 bis Witnesses and
Reasons for Decision To Hear the Evidence of Those Witnesses via Video-Conference
Link, 7 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 3, 2009); see also Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motions To Summon and Protect
Defence Witnesses, and on the Giving of Evidence by Video-Link, 19 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia June 25, 1996) (describing the standard for VCT witness
testimony that preceded the adoption of a formal rule: namely, that the witness's
testimony is so important that it would be unfair to proceed without it and that the
witness is unable or unwilling to come to the Tribunal to testify).
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required to show the guilt or innocence of the defendant, while at the
same time protecting the defendant's interest in being able to
examine the witnesses against him.
As to the first criterion, the ICTY has concluded that concerns
related to the witness's health and safety may satisfy the requirement
that the witness be unable or unwilling for good reason to testify in
person. For example, in Prosecutor v. Stanigi6, the Tribunal decided
the prosecutor had sufficiently established that one witness was
unable to travel to the Hague based on a doctor's report showing the
poor state of the witness's health.3 8 It further concluded that two
other prosecution witnesses had "good reasons to be unwilling to
travel" due to their advanced age since both were over seventy-five
years old. 39 In Prosecutor v. Tad(c, the Tribunal found that defense
counsel had met its burden of demonstrating that certain witnesses
were sufficiently unwilling to attend the trial in the Hague because
they feared arrest by the prosecution. 40 In Prosecutor v. Gotovina,
there was no specific information showing that several witnesses
were unable or unwilling to travel to the Hague. 4 1 Nevertheless, the
Tribunal concluded that ordering the witnesses to be cross-examined
by video link, rather than in person, was consistent with the interests
of justice because the witnesses' combined testimonies would take no
more than one court day and because of the need to expeditiously
42
conclude the trial.
Regarding the third criterion of the ICTY's interests-of-justice
test, ICTY decisions emphasize the similarities between remote and
live testimony and generally decline to find that remote testimony
would violate the defendant's rights to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. 43 In fact, in Gotovina, the Tribunal explained as follows:

38.
Stanigi5, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Decision on Prosecution Motions To Hear
12-14.
Witnesses by Video-Conference Link,
39.
Id.
40.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motions To Summon
and Protect Defence Witnesses, and on the Giving of Evidence by Video-Link, 19.
41.
Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Reasons for Decision Granting
Prosecution's Motion To Cross-Examine Four Proposed Rule 92 bis Witnesses and
Reasons for Decision To Hear the Evidence of Those Witnesses via Video-Conference
Link, 12.
42.
Id. The Tribunal noted that although three criteria guide the decision on
whether to permit remote witness testimony, the ultimate determination is whether
permitting VCT testimony "would be consistent with the interests of justice." Id. 7.
According to Article 21(4)(e) of the ICTY Statute, a defendant has the right
43.
"to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him." Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (Sept. 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file[Legal%20Library/Statute/
statute_sept09_en.pdf.
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According to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, video conferencing
is an extension of the Trial Chamber to the location of the witness that
neither denies the accused his or her right to confront the witness, nor
causes him or her material prejudice by the physical absence of the
witness. Video conferencing therefore respects the right of the accused
to cross-examine and directly confront witnesses while observing their
reactions, and allows the Chamber to assess the credibility and
reliability of the testimony in the same manner as for a witness in the
courtroom. Testimony by video-conference link should be given as much
44
probative value as testimony presented in the courtroom.

Even when the ICTY determines that allowing remote witness
testimony is in the interests of justice, however, the Tribunal has
emphasized the need for safeguards' to ensure that the remote
testimony is as similar as possible to live, in-person testimony. In its
Tadic decision, for example, the Tribunal suggested implementing the
following guidelines for the orderly conduct of video-link testimony.
First, the testimony should be given in an appropriate venue, such as
a courtroom or embassy, where the witness would be encouraged to
give truthful and open testimony and where "the safety and solemnity
of the proceedings" can be guaranteed. 4 5 In addition, a "Presiding
Officer" should be present to oversee the proceedings, administer an
oath so that witnesses understand their obligation to speak truthfully
or face prosecution for perjury, and ensure that testimony is given
freely and voluntarily. 46 Finally, the technology must incorporate
monitors that allow witnesses to view "the Judges, the accused, and
47
the questioner," and vice versa.

44.
Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Reasons for Decision Granting
Prosecution's Motion To Cross-Examine Four Proposed Rule 92 bis Witnesses and
Reasons for Decision To Hear the Evidence of Those Witnesses via Video-Conference
Link,
8; see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karadii6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on
Prosecution's Motion for Testimony To Be Heard via Video-Conference Link, 9 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 17, 2010) (agreeing that the use of
videoconference link would not violate the accused's right to confront the witness);
Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, IT-05-87, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Testimony of
K58 To Be Heard via Video Link Conference,
2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 1, 2006) (granting a motion for video-link testimony with the same
reasoning as the Gotovina court). It bears noting that in its first case considering the
possibility of remote witness testimony in 1996, the Tribunal initially suggested that
the "evidentiary value of testimony provided by video-link, although weightier than
that of testimony given by deposition, is not as weighty as testimony given in the
courtroom." Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motions To Summon
and Protect Defence Witnesses, and on the Giving of Evidence by Video-Link, 21.
45.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motions To Summon
and Protect Defence Witnesses, and on the Giving of Evidence by Video-Link, 22.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
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48
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The ICTR also allows witnesses to testify remotely under some
circumstances that similarly balance the interests of the various
parties to the proceeding. Although Rule 90(A) of the ICTR's Rules of
Procedure and Evidence 49 states that witnesses should testify in
person at the court, the ICTR permits remote VCT witness testimony
when "'necessary to safeguard the witness's security' or in the
interest of justice. ' 50 In determining whether VCT witness testimony
is in the interests of justice, the ICTR considers: (1) "the importance
of [the witness's] testimony," (2) "the witness's inability or
unwillingness to attend," and (3) "whether a good reason has been
adduced for that inability or unwillingness." 5 1 The party seeking
provision for remote witness testimony bears the burden of
demonstrating "that the witness has a credible basis for refusal, and
that those grounds are genuinely held, giving a Chamber reason to
believe that he or she will not testify unless a Chamber allows the
witness to do so via video-link. '52 When ruling on a request for
testimony by VCT, the ICTR will also consider the rights of the
parties to the proceeding "by ensuring in particular that the witness's
appearance on a video screen instead of his/her physical presence in
the courtroom does not reduce the parties' ability to evaluate his/her
53
testimony and to cross-examine him/her.1
On the question of what constitutes a valid reason for a witness
to be deemed genuinely unable or unwilling to testify in person, it

48.
The United Nations established the ICTR in 1994 to preside over crimes
committed during the civil war in Rwanda. See generally VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL
P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998) (providing an

in-depth account of the creation of the Tribunal and its governing rules and statute).
49.
Rule 90(A) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that
"[w]itnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by Chambers." Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 90(A), U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/REV.1 (June 29, 1995).
50.
Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55C-T, Decision on
Prosecutor's Extremely Urgent Motion for Testimony via Video-Link,
5 (Feb. 14,
2011) (quoting Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on the
Prosecution Request for Testimony of Witness BT via Video-Link (TC),
8 (Oct. 8,
2004)).

51.
Id. 6.
52.
Id.
53.
Prosecution v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-PT, Decision on
Prosecution's Motion To Have Prosecution Witness NN Testify by Video-Link, 2 (Dec.
30, 2008). Like the ICTY Statute, the Statute for the ICTR provides that an accused
has the right "[t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him or her." Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 20(4)(e), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598, available at
http://www.unictr.orgPortals/O/Englishlbegal/Statute/2010.pdf.
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appears that health, safety, and work-related travel concerns can all
be sufficient in some instances. In Prosecutor v. Rukundo, the
Tribunal allowed a witness to testify remotely for the prosecution
because medical documentation demonstrated that he was too ill to
travel from Rwanda to Arusha. 54 It also permitted another witness in
the case to testify by video when affidavit evidence showed the
witness had been victimized in Rwanda after previously testifying
before the Tribunal and feared similar reprisals should he be seen
leaving Rwanda to testify again.5 5 Indeed, in that case, the ICTR also
rejected the defense's request to require the parties to travel to
Rwanda to hear the witnesses testify in person, stating:
The Chamber is not convinced that such a course of action is necessary
in order to safeguard the right of the Accused to confront witnesses
against him, or for the preparation of cross-examination. In the
Chamber's view the right of the Accused to a fair trial will be
adequately preserved by allowing each of the Parties to send a
representative to the venue of the video-link proceedings to look after
their respective interests. However, all the examinations of the witness
will be conducted from the courtroom in Arusha.56

Regarding work-related travel concerns, in Prosecutor v.
Nchamihigo, the ICTR concluded that the prosecution had met its
burden of showing a witness was unable or unwilling to testify in
person when the evidence showed the witness was under travel
restrictions imposed by his employer.5 7 The Tribunal explained that
the prosecution had attempted to negotiate the witness's release from
his employer, but that the employer had continued to refuse.5 8 In
such circumstances, allowing the witness to testify remotely
furthered the "interest of justice" standard. 59 Conversely, the ICTR
decided there was no credible basis for a witness's refusal to testify
when the witness claimed in only vague terms and only one week
before he was scheduled to testify that he feared he would lose his job
or face harassment at work if he were required to appear in person at
60
the Tribunal.

54.
Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-PT, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Urgent Motion for Witnesses BPA and BLR To Give Testimony via VideoLink, 7 13 (Mar. 1, 2007).
55.
Id. 7 5, 14.
56.
Id. 7 15.
57.
Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-T, Decision on the
Prosecution Motion To Hear the Testimony of Witness LM by Video-Link, TT 5-6 (Jan.
25, 2007).
58.
Id. 76.
59.
Id. 77.
60.
See Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55C-T, Decision on
Prosecutor's Extremely Urgent Motion for Testimony via Video-Link,
1, 8 (Feb. 14,
2011) (emphasizing that the defendant's fear of losing employment is not a credible
basis for a refusal to testify).
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In sum, the ICTR has concluded in various situations that
allowing some witnesses to testify remotely would further the
interests of justice and also properly balance the interests of the
various parties to the proceeding, while still ensuring a fair trial.
However, the ICTR has also emphasized that "[h]earing testimony via
video-link is an exceptional measure, granted only upon sound and
legitimate justification based on proper documentation."6 1 Moreover,
a review of the Tribunal's jurisprudence indicates that not all judges
are convinced that testimony by VCT truly and fully replicates the
experience of live, in-person witness testimony. In a 2006 decision,
one chamber of the ICTR expressed concerns about the Tribunal's
ability to assess the demeanor of a particularly important prosecution
witness should that witness testify remotely. 62 In considering a
prosecution motion urging a reconsideration of the chamber's decision
denying the request to allow that witness to testify by VCT, the
chamber explained that although it agreed the prosecution had
shown that the witness had reasons to fear for his safety should he
testify in person, it was also satisfied that the ICTR could provide
heightened security measures sufficient to ensure the witness's safety
in Arusha. 63 In a subsequent case, Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, the
ICTR again emphasized the ability of the court in Arusha to
safeguard witnesses to allow for testimony in person. 64 The Tribunal
noted that it was willing to accommodate witnesses who fear for their
safety, but that those witnesses would only be able to testify remotely
upon affidavit evidence clearly stating the precise nature of their
fears and when it found there were no other appropriate methods to
65
ensure the witness's safety in Arusha.

61.
Prosecutor v. Ndahimana, Case No. ICTR-2001-68-T, Decision on Defence
Motion To Hear the Testimony of Witnesses BX7 and FB1 via Video Link, 16 (Feb.
25, 2011).
62.
Prosecutor v. Zigranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-T, Decision on the
Prosecution Joint Motion for Re-Opening Its Case and for Reconsideration of the 31
January 2006 Decision on the Hearing of Witness Michel Bagaragaza via Video-Link,
22 (Nov. 16, 2006).
63.
Id. 24.
64.
See Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55C-T, Decision on Prosecutor's
Extremely Urgent Motion for Testimony via Video-Link,
5 (stating that, while
witnesses should generally appear in person, testimony in lieu of physical appearance
may be used "when necessary to safeguard the witness's security" (quoting Prosecutor
v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on the Prosecution Request for
Testimony of Witness BT via Video-Link (TC), 8 (Oct. 8, 2004)).
65.
See id. (stating that the burden of proof rests with the party making the
request to show the grounds of the witness's fear and that the witness would not testify
other than by video-link).
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The Special Court for Sierra Leone6 6

According to Rule 85(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the SCSL, "[e]vidence may be given directly in court, or via such
communications media, including video, closed-circuit television, as
the Trial Chamber may order." 67 Decisions of the SCSL provide
guidance on when remote video testimony is proper under Rule 85(D).
Similar to the ICTY and ICTR, the SCSL allows remote testimony by
VCT only when it would further the interests of justice and after
considering the particular circumstances making the witness unable
to travel to the court. 68 Indeed, in Prosecutor v. Taylor, the court
rejected the prosecution's request for a rule allowing parties to
present witness testimony by VCT as a general matter unless the
party opposing the request showed good cause as to why denying the
69
remote method of testimony existed for a particular witness.
Rather, the court noted that although Rule 85(D) imposes no
conditions on the use of video testimony, it and other rules of the
court demonstrate a general preference for witnesses to give evidence
directly in the presence of the court. 70 Even though the rules also do
not require "a face to face" confrontation between the accused and
every individual, the court emphasized that it must make decisions
about the conduct of the trial that further the "interests of justice,"

66.
The SCSL was established by agreement between the United Nations and
the Government for Sierra Leone in August 2000. The SCSL has the power to
prosecute persons who are most responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian and Sierra Leone law committed in Sierra Leone since 1996. Statute of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1, Aug. 14, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter
SCSL Statute], available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClndlM
JeEw%3d&tabid=176.
67.
SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE R. P. & EVID., available at http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yNjqn5TIYKs%3d&tabid=176.
68.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Public
Prosecution Motion To Allow Witness TF1-303 To Give Testimony by Video-Link (Nov.
18, 2008) (granting prosecution's unopposed motion to permit remote testimony where
witness recently gave birth); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT-217,
Decision on Prosecution Motion To Allow Witnesses To Give Testimony by Video-Link),
25-27 (Mar. 30, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-O1-PT-217.pdf
(denying prosecution motion for a general order allowing parties to present testimony
remotely unless the opposing party shows good cause to deny this method of receiving
testimony by particular witnesses).
69.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT-217, Decision on Prosecution Motion To
Allow Witnesses To Give Testimony by Video-Link,
25-27.
70.
Id.
22-24. The SCSL does not grant the accused a right to confront or be
confronted by the witnesses against him. However, pursuant to Article 17 § (4)(e) of the
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, among the rights guaranteed to an
accused is the right "[t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under
the same conditions as witnesses against him or her." SCSL Statute, supra note 66.
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and not for "no reason at all." 71 The court concluded that any

decisions to exercise its discretion to permit remote VCT witness
testimony would take into account the interests of justice, would be
considered on a case-by-case basis, and would address the particular
72
circumstances making the witness unable to come to the court.
Like the ICTY, the SCSL has also required that some safeguards
be implemented so that remote witness testimony resembles inperson courtroom testimony as much as possible. The court has
required witnesses to testify from a courtroom where the "safety and
solemnity of the proceedings" can be guaranteed. 73 It has also
required the presence of a "Courtroom Officer" to oversee the
proceedings, to inform witnesses of their duty to testify truthfully or
be subject to a prosecution for perjury, and to "ensure that the
testimony is given freely and voluntarily. ' 74 In addition, the court has
permitted the parties to have a representative in the remote location
to monitor the proceedings. 75 Finally, as to the adequacy of the
technology, the SCSL requires that witnesses be able to view "the
76
Judges, the Accused and the questioner" from a monitor.
4.

77
The International Criminal Court

Under Rule 67 of the ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the
ICC may permit a witness to testify remotely by audio or video
provided that (1) the technology permits the witness to be examined
by all parties at the time of the witness's testimony and (2) the trial
chamber ensures the "venue chosen for the conduct of the audio or
video-link testimony is conducive to the giving of truthful and open
testimony and to the safety, physical and psychological well-being,

71.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT-217, Decision on Prosecution Motion To
Allow Witnesses To Give Testimony by Video-Link,
25-26.
72.
Id. 26.
73.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Public Prosecution Motion To
Allow Witness TF1-303 To Give Testimony by Video-Link, 3.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
The ICC came into existence in July 2002 after the required sixty states
had ratified the Rome Statute creating the court. The ICC is the first permanent,
treaty-based international criminal court. States that have ratified the treaty creating
the ICC agree that investigations may be commenced against the state's own nationals
for the covered crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, as long as
those crimes were committed after the court came into existence or after the state
ratified the treaty, whichever is later. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 11, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 91 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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dignity and privacy of the witness." 78 The limited case law
interpreting and applying Rule 67 in the ICC's relatively brief
existence suggests that the court views it as broadly authorizing
remote witness testimony. While recognizing the presumption that
witnesses will ordinarily testify live,79 the court has stated that it will
authorize the use of audio or video-link testimony when necessary, so
long as the venue for the testimony would be conducive to 'the giving
of truthful and open testimony and to the safety, physical and
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of the witness."'8 0 It has
also emphasized that it is not required to limit applications for
remote video testimony to only those situations in which witnesses
were unwilling or unable to attend court proceedings for medical or
other reasons.8 1 Rather, "subject to the fundamental dictates of a fair
trial," the ICC may consider a wide variety of factors in determining
whether under the circumstances of the particular case a witness
82
should be permitted to testify remotely using VCT.

78.
INT'L CRIM. CT. R. P. & EVID., available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/F1E0AC 1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8B 15E886/140164/Rules-oLprocedure_
andEvidenceEnglish.pdf.
79.
See Rome Statute, supra note 77, art. 69(2) (providing that witness
testimony shall be given in person unless provided by Article 68 or other rules).
Whether the ICC can actually require witnesses to travel to the Hague to testify in
person, however, is another matter. Article 64(6)(b) of the Rome Statute empowers the
court to "[riequire the attendance and testimony of witnesses," but Article 93(1)(e)
imposes upon States Party only the duty to facilitate the voluntary appearance of
individuals to appear as witnesses. See Claus Kress, The Procedural Law of the
InternationalCriminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise, 1 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 603, 616 (2003) (noting the apparent inconsistency between the two
articles).
80.
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on
Various Issues Related to Witnesses' Testimony During Trial, 41 (Jan. 29, 2008)
(citing INT'L CRIM. CT. R. P. & EVID. 67(3)). The court further explained that it would
make decisions about allowing such remote testimony "on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account the views and concerns of the witness, the parties and, where relevant, the
participants." Id.
81.
See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04/01-06, Redacted
Decision on the Defence Request for a Witness To Give Evidence via Video-Link,
7 3, 15-16 (Feb. 9, 2010) (granting defense's request to permit adult witness to testify
remotely where witness lived in conditions of extreme poverty, had never used many
modern conveniences, had no passport, and would have been extremely vulnerable and
uncomfortable if she had to leave the general area where she currently resided); see
also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-947, Redacted Decision on
the "Request for the Conduct of the Testimony of Witness CAR-OTP-WWWW-0108 by
Video-Link," TT 5-15 (Oct. 12, 2010) (rejecting defense's suggestion that remote VCT
adult witness testimony should only be allowed in cases where medical reasons
physically prevent witnesses from traveling or where testifying live would affect
psychological well-being of witness).
82.
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04/01-06, Redacted Decision on the Defence
Request for a Witness To Give Evidence via Video-Link, T 15.
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In fact, in Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, the ICC explained that
Rule 67 permits remote VCT witness testimony "whenever necessary,
provided that the Statute and the Rules are respected and that such
measures are not prejudicial to, or inconsistent with, the rights of the
accused. 83 The court noted that the rights granted to the accused
according to Article 67(1)(e) of the Rome Statute are to "examine or
have examined the witnesses against him or her."8 4 Because VCT
technology permits the witness to be examined by the defense at the
time the witness is testifying remotely in court,8 5 the court stated
that the rights granted to an accused are therefore not compromised
86
by remote testimony.

83.
Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-947, Redacted Decision on the "Request
for the Conduct of the Testimony of Witness CAR-OTP-WWWW-0108 by Video-Link,"

10.
84.
Id.
11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although an earlier draft of
the Rome Statute guaranteed an accused the right to "confront and cross-examine"
witnesses, the final draft adopted the text of Article 14(3)(e) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, pursuant to Article 67(1)(e), guarantees an
accused the right "[t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her."
William A. Schabas, Rights of the Accused, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 845,

859 (Otto Tiffterrer ed., 1999). Therefore, the rights granted to an accused under the
Rome Statute as concerns examining witnesses are identical to those provided to an
accused in the statutes creating the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL. Compare Rome Statute,
supra note 77, art. 67(1)(e), with supra notes 43, 53, 70 (discussing the similar
provisions of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL).
85.
Reports indicate that the ICC technology allowing for remote VCT witness
testimony functioned well during trials. See Duane W. Krohnke, International
Criminal Court: Recent Developments in Other ICC Investigations and Cases,
DWKCOMMENTARIES, (Nov. 11, 2011, 4:53 AM) http://dwkcommentaries.wordpress.com/
20 11/11/1 8/international-criminal-court-recent-developments-in-other-iccinvestigations-and-cases/ (reporting by ICC Deputy Prosecutor on developments in the
ICC and noting that some witnesses in the situation for the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) testified by way of video-link from the DRC without any technical
problems).
See Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-947, Redacted Decision on the
86.
"Request for the Conduct of the Testimony of Witness CAR-OTP-WAWW-0108 by
Video-Link,"
1-2, 12 (granting request to permit prosecution witness to testify
remotely by VCT because of witness's personal circumstances, which appear from the
redacted decision to have required his presence at important work); see also Prosecutor
v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-2101-Red2, Public Redacted Decision on the
"Prosecution Request To Hear Witness CAR-OTP-PPPP-0036's Testimony via VideoLink,"
9-10 (Feb. 3, 2012) (permitting prosecution witness to testify remotely by
VCT given witness's health status and because the defense's ability to appropriately
question the witness would "mitigate any prejudice to the accused's rights as enshrined
in Article 67(1)(e) of the Statute").

20121

VIRTUAL WITNESS CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL CASES

1303

B. Remote VCT ProsecutionTestimony in Federal Courts
in the United States
This subpart focuses on federal court decisions, rather than state
court decisions, because in the United States, maritime piracy is a
crime under federal law.8 7 Accordingly, it is the federal courts in the
United States that are most likely to face the question of whether to
allow adult prosecution witnesses to testify by two-way, live VCT in
the types of cases with which this Article is concerned.
Like the international criminal courts, some federal courts in the
United States have permitted adult prosecution witnesses to testify
remotely in criminal cases. A review of the case law, however,
indicates some wariness in allowing prosecution witnesses to testify
remotely. Moreover, that review shows that the various federal
courts-and even individual judges within those courts-do not
necessarily agree on the circumstances under which that testimony is
proper.
One reason for this lack of an apparent consensus is the fact that
the Supreme Court has not actually taken a case requiring it to
decide whether and under what circumstances adult prosecution
witnesses are constitutionally permitted to testify by two-way, live
VCT in criminal cases. As a result, lower courts are left to interpret
other relevant existing Supreme Court precedent to determine the
precise nature of a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which grants the
88
accused the right to "be confronted with the witnesses against him."
Some federal courts view the Confrontation Clause as essentially
guaranteeing the defendant a general right to contemporaneously
cross-examine adverse witnesses. 89 Under this view, a defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights do not differ substantially from the fairtrial rights guaranteed to defendants under the rules of the various
international criminal courts and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which grant the accused a right "to examine or
have examined" the witnesses against him. 90 However, some courts in

87.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (stating that piracy as defined by the law of
nations is a federal crime).
88.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

See, e.g., Marc Chase McAllister, Two-Way Video Trial Testimony and the
89.
Confrontation Clause: Fashioninga Better Craig Test in Light of Crawford, 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 836, 841-42 (2007) (describing the underlying protections of the
Confrontation Clause according to Supreme Court precedents as encompassing a right
to cross-examine adverse witnesses and a right to a face-to-face confrontation).
See sources cited supra note 84. The European Convention for the
90.
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) similarly grants an
accused the right "to examine or have examined the witnesses against him." European
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the United States view a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights as
including a more specific right to examine witnesses face-to-face in
the defendant's physical presence. 9 1 Whether a court in the United
States is more or less inclined to permit remote prosecution-witness
testimony in criminal cases depends in part on the level of
significance it attaches to the face-to-face component of the
92
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.
This subpart discusses the two Supreme Court cases that have
so far guided lower federal court decisions on whether to permit adult
prosecution witnesses to testify remotely in criminal cases. It then
discusses the two different tests that the federal appellate courts
have used to determine whether to admit this testimony in light of
the Supreme Court's guidance. The subpart concludes by briefly
noting some more recent developments in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence as relates to the Confrontation Clause and the question
of when adult witnesses might be able to testify remotely by two-way,
live video in criminal cases.
1.

U.S. Supreme Court Cases Guiding Lower Court Decisions on
Whether to Admit Remote Adult Prosecution-Witness Testimony

The Supreme Court cases to which the lower courts have turned
for guidance when deciding whether to permit remote adult
prosecution-witness testimony are Coy v. Iowa 93 and Maryland v.
Craig.94 Both of those cases addressed the nature of the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights in the context of live testimony by child
witnesses during trial, but outside the immediate presence of the
defendant. As the discussion of those cases below illustrates,
however, the Court has not been exactly consistent-or unanimousin its statements about the nature of a defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights and how absolutely the clause requires witnesses to

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
6(3)(d), June 1,2010, C.E.T.S. No. 5,amended by Protocol Nos. 11, 14. The ECHR was
adopted in 1950 and entered into force in 1953. All forty-seven member states of the
Council of Europe have ratified it. See DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O'BOYLE & COLIN
WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1-2 (2d ed. 2009).

91.
See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1312-14 (11th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (holding that the accused has a right to physical face-to-face confrontation).
92.
Compare United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1999)
(disagreeing with defendant that Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights could
only be preserved by "face-to-face confrontation with [witnesses] in the same room"),
with Yates, 438 F.3d at 1315-16 (suggesting that the Confrontation Clause grants the
defendant a "right to face-to-face physical confrontation" that can only be denied in
certain limited circumstances and indicating that "confrontation through a video
monitor is not the same as physical face-to-face confrontation").
93.
487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
94.
497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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testify face-to-face in the physical presence of the defendant in
criminal cases.
a.

Coy v. Iowa

In Coy v. Iowa, the Supreme Court reversed a sexual-assault
conviction, concluding that the lower court's decision to permit two
child witnesses to testify behind a large screen where they could not
see the defendant violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights. 95 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, stated: "We have never doubted ... that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with
witnesses appearing before the trier of fact. ' 96 Justice Scalia
suggested that requiring witnesses to physically face the defendant
serves several important purposes, including making it less likely
that witnesses will lie since "[i]t is always more difficult to tell a lie
about a person to his face than behind his back. '9 7 Furthermore, even
if the witness does lie, Justice Scalia suggested that the lie would be
less convincing when recited in the presence of the defendant and the
trier of fact. 98 Thus, he stated that like a less explicit component of
the Confrontation Clause, which gives the defendant the right to
cross-examine his accuser, the component granting the defendant the
right to face-to-face confrontation also serves to "ensur[e] the
99
integrity of the fact-finding process."
Even though the Court found that the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights were violated in the instant case, Justice Scalia
nevertheless recognized that the "rights conferred by the
Confrontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to other
important interests."'10 0 It declined to provide particulars, but the
Court stated that any exceptions to the Confrontation Clause
protections "would surely be allowed only when necessary to further
an important public policy." 101 However, because there had been "no
individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special
protection," the Supreme Court held that the lower court's decision to
permit them to testify behind a screen "could not be sustained by any
10 2
conceivable exception.'

95.
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014-15, 1022.
96.
Id. at 1016.
97.
Id. at 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 1019-20 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
100.
Id. at 1020.
101.
Id. at 1021.
102.
Id.
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It bears noting that in Coy, four Justices wrote or joined in
separate concurring or dissenting opinions to voice some
disagreements with the majority's reasoning as it related to the
nature and extent of the rights afforded defendants under the
Confrontation Clause.1 0 3 In her concurring opinion in which Justice
White joined, Justice O'Connor emphasized that any right conferred
by the Confrontation Clause requiring the witness to face the
defendant physically was not absolute. 0 4 She noted that the Court
had stated on many prior occasions that the "[c]lause reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial" and that the
"preference may be overcome in a particular case if close examination
of competing interests so warrants.' 10 5 She further suggested that
most state laws protecting child witnesses would be unaffected by the
Court's opinion and should not raise substantial Confrontation
Clause problems because those laws typically provide for testimony
by one- or two-way, closed-circuit television, which means that
06
testimony is essentially in the presence of the defendant.'
The dissent written by Justice Blackmun, and in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined, took issue with the Coy majority's
conclusion that the plain language of the Confrontation Clause was
meant to ensure that the witness testify face-to-face in the physical
presence of the defendant.10 7 Those Justices argued instead that the
Clause's primary purpose is to ensure that defendants are permitted
to cross-examine the witnesses against them. 0 8 To support their
argument, the dissent referenced Supreme Court precedent
recognizing "that the Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent
the use of ex parte affidavits, to provide the opportunity for crossexamination, and to compel the defendant to stand face to face with
the jury."'1 9 Justice Blackmun further referenced the work of John
Henry Wigmore, who argued that the very existence of the hearsay
rule demonstrated that the right to confrontation is provided not so

103.
See id. at 1022-35 (O'Connor and White, JJ., concurring, and Blackmun, J.,
and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
104.
Id. at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105.
Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
106.
Id. at 1023-24 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
107.
See id. at 1021; id. at 1028 (Blackmun, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's "apparent fascination with the witness' ability to see the
defendant" will lead to sacrifice of other more important confrontation interests).
108.
See id. at 1029 (Blackmun, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (analyzing
Supreme Court precedent discussing the Confrontation Clause right in terms of the
right to cross-examine).
109.
Id. at 1028 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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upon each other, but
that the witness and defendant can "gaze"
110
instead to allow for cross-examination.
b.

Maryland v. Craig

Just two years later, in Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court
again addressed the question of whether the Confrontation Clause
permitted a child witness to testify live during a trial, but outside of
the presence of the defendant.'1 1 This time, Justice O'Connor wrote
for the majority and Justice Scalia wrote for the dissent. 112 In Craig,
the Court held that permitting a child witness to testify by one-way,
closed-circuit television, outside the defendant's presence, did not
violate the Confrontation Clause. 113 Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion explained that the Supreme Court has "never held ... that
the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the
absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them
at trial."114 Rather, consistent with the reasoning reflected in her Coy
concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated the Court's "precedents
establish that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for faceto-face confrontation at trial.., that must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." 115
Justice O'Connor went on to explain that despite the preference for
face-to-face confrontation, "[t]he central concern of the Confrontation
Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal
in the context of an
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing
116
adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."
In light of these principles, the Craig Court stated a two-part
test for determining when a defendant's confrontation rights will not
be violated, even absent a physical, face-to-face meeting at trial with
the witnesses against him. First, there must be a case-specific finding
that the denial of physical face-to-face "confrontation is necessary to
further an important public policy." 11 7 Second, the testimony's

Id. at 1029 (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 150 (1974)).
110.
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (stating the question of the
111.
case).
Joining in the majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor were Chief
112.
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, and Kennedy. Id. at 840-60. Joining
in the dissent written by Justice Scalia were Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
Id. at 860-70.
Id. at 852-53, 855 (majority opinion). In Craig,the child witness testified in
113.
a separate room in the courthouse in the presence of the attorneys, and the testimony
was displayed by way of a video monitor to the courtroom in which the judge, jury, and
defendant were present. See id. at 841-42.
Id. at 844.
114.
Id. at 849 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115.
Id. at 845.
116.
Id. at 850, 856.
117.
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reliability "must be otherwise assured."118 As to the reliability of the
testimony, the Court indicated that the Confrontation Clause
guaranteed the defendant the following: (1) a personal examination of
witnesses, (2) who testify under oath, (3) subject to crossexamination, and (4) in a manner that permits the trier of fact to
observe the witness's demeanor, hence aiding in an assessment of the
witness's credibility. 1 9 Applying the two-part test to the case before
it, the Craig Court held that the state might have made a casespecific showing that permitting the child witness to testify by oneway, closed-circuit testimony was necessary to further the important
state interest of protecting child witnesses in child abuse cases from
the trauma of testifying before their abusers, and remanded the case
to the court of appeals for that determination. 120 In addition, the
Court found that the procedure used to permit the child to testify
assured the reliability of the evidence presented against the
defendant because the child testified under oath, the defendant was
permitted the "full opportunity for contemporaneous crossexamination," and the judge, jury, and defendant were able to view
1 1
the child's demeanor-albeit by video--during the testimony.
2.

Federal Circuit Split on the Proper Test to Apply in Determining
When to Permit Adult Prosecution Witnesses to Testify by TwoWay, Live VCT

The discussion above shows that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause allows room for remote
testimony and that any face-to-face requirement under the
Confrontation Clause may yield under certain circumstances, so long
as other rights, such as the right to cross-examine witnesses, are
preserved. However, neither Coy nor Craig involved the question of
whether to allow adult prosecution witnesses to testify by two-way,
live VCT in criminal cases. Accordingly, this subpart examines the
two different approaches that federal circuit courts have taken since
the Supreme Court's decision in Craig to determine whether and
when adult prosecution witnesses may testify remotely in criminal
cases consistent with a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. In
United States v. Gigante, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that "[u]pon a finding of exceptional circumstances.. . a
trial court may allow a witness to testify via two-way closed-circuit
television when this furthers the interest of justice.' 1 2 2 The Eleventh

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 850.
Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 860.
Id. at 851.
United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Circuit in United States v. Yates, however, concluded that Craig's test
for determining the propriety of one-way, closed-circuit testimony
applied equally to determining the permissibility of two-way, live
VCT prosecution witness testimony. 1 3 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
decided that permitting a prosecution witness to testify by two-way,
live VCT violates the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights unless
the court concludes that remote testimony is "necessary to further an
important public policy. . . and the reliability of the testimony is
otherwise assured. ' 12 4 This subpart discusses both of these cases in
125
more detail below.
In Gigante, the Second Circuit found no violation of a defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights when the trial court permitted a mob
informant dying of inoperable cancer to testify from a remote location
by two-way, live VCT against an alleged boss of the Genovese crime
family who was also too ill to travel. 126 The court explicitly rejected the
defendant's argument that the Sixth Amendment entitled him to a
face-to-face confrontation with the witness against him "in the same
room."127 It also refused to apply the Craig test, explaining that the
test in Craig was "crafted ...to constrain the use of one-way closedcircuit television, whereby the witness could not possibly view the
defendant. 1 28 Indeed, the court stated that the two-way
videoconferencing procedure "preserved the face-to-face confrontation
celebrated by Coy."'129 Furthermore, it found that the two-way video
procedure was sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause's central
concern of ensuring the reliability of the evidence against a criminal
defendant: the witness "was sworn; he was subject to full crossexamination; he testified in full view of the jury, court, and defense

123.
See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(stating that Craigsupplies the proper test).
124.
See id. at 1314 (restating the Craig test applied to the two-way video
system at hand).
125.
This discussion is limited to consideration of only these two cases in detail
because they were the only two where courts actually decided what test should apply to
the question of whether adult witnesses can testify for the prosecution in a criminal
case by two-way, live VCT. I do not discuss in detail here the cases that involved adult
witness testimony, but where the question was limited to determining whether the
lower court's decision violated clearly established federal law. See Gigante, 166 F.3d at
81. I also do not discuss here in detail the other circuit court cases that considered the
question of allowing child witnesses to testify remotely in sexual-assault cases. See
generally Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (discussing the precedent on remote
testimony by child witnesses to sexual assaults).
126.
Gigante, 166 F.3d at 79-81.
127.
Id. at 80.
128.
Id. at 80-81.
129.
Id. at 81.
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counsel; and [he] gave [his] testimony under the eye of the [the
130
defendant] himself."
Given the constitutional protections afforded by two-way video,
the Gigante court decided that a more appropriate test for
determining when this remote testimony is proper should be based on
the standard used to admit Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule
15 deposition testimony at trial-an "exceptional circumstances"
test.13 1 The "exceptional circumstances" to introduce a Rule 15
deposition as substantive evidence at trial exist when the "witness's
testimony is material to the case and if the witness is unavailable to
appear at trial."'132 The court thus reasoned that under the
circumstances of the case before it, the trial court could have
133
admitted the dying witness's testimony via a Rule 15 deposition.
Yet, it also pointed out that the closed-circuit video presentation of
the witness's testimony that the trial court used instead actually
afforded the defendant greater confrontation rights than if "the bare
transcript of the [witness's] deposition" had been admitted at trial
against him. 134 The court concluded that it made little sense to adopt
a stricter standard than the one articulated by Rule 15 to assess the
propriety of introducing two-way, live VCT at trial, holding that such
testimony was constitutionally permitted when the court makes a
finding of "exceptional circumstances.' 13 5 Those "exceptional
circumstances" were present according to the Second Circuit Gigante
court because the witness's health prevented him from traveling and
because the defendant's health also prevented him from participating
136
in a distant deposition.
By contrast, in Yates, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial
court's decision to allow two Australian nationals to testify remotely
from Australia against two defendants in a criminal trial in Alabama
rights,
Confrontation
Clause
the
defendants'
violated
notwithstanding that the witnesses were beyond the government's

130.
Id. at 80. During the trial, video screens transmitted the witness's image to
the court, the jury, defense counsel, and the defendant. The witness could also see and
hear all courtroom participants on a video screen at his location. Id.
131.
Id. at 81.
132.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure states: "A party may move that a prospective witness be deposed in
order to preserve testimony for trial. The court may grant the motion because of
exceptional circumstances and in the interests of justice." FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1).
See Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81 (stating that the lower court judge could have
133.
admitted the testimony under Rule 15 without violating the Confrontation Clause).
134.
See id. (stating that, had the transcript of a Rule 15 deposition been used in
court, the defendant would not have had any opportunity to visually assess the
witness's demeanor).
135.
Id.
136.
Id. at 81-82.
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subpoena powers. 137 Even though the case before it involved two-way,
live VCT, the Yates court held that the Craig test, rather than the
Gigante test, applied to the question of whether the remote testimony
violated the defendants' confrontation rights. 138 In fact, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the Second Circuit was the only federal appeals
court to make a distinction between one- and two-way video
testimony in its Confrontation Clause analysis. Other courts, instead,
applied the Craigtest in deciding whether to allow child witnesses to
139
testify by two-way, live VCT.
More specifically, the Yates court disagreed with the
government's assertion that two-way video provides greater
protections of a defendant's confrontation rights than does a Rule 15
deposition, and that two-way video testimony should therefore be
admitted under the same standard as Rule 15 depositions.' 4 0 The
court reasoned that because the defendant can be present at Rule 15
depositions, those proceedings do not result in any denial of the
defendant's constitutional rights to a "physical face-to-face
confrontation."'141 On the other hand, the court stated "the simple
truth" that "confrontation through a video monitor is not the same as
physical face-to-face confrontation. ' 14 2 It therefore held that "[tlhe
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to confront one's accuser is
most certainly compromised when the confrontation occurs through
143
an electronic medium."'
To further support its conclusion that the Craig test governed
the situation before it, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the fact that in
2002, the Supreme Court refused to recommend to Congress a
proposed amendment to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure that would have explicitly permitted video testimony in
"exceptional circumstances. ' 144 Under Proposed Rule 26(b), federal
courts would have been able to authorize two-way, live VCT from a
remote location in criminal cases "in the interest of justice" when the

137.
United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
138.
Id. at 1312-13.
139.
See id. at 1313-14 (referencing cases in the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits where courts applied the Craig test in determining whether to admit
two-way, live VCT testimony of child witnesses in sexual-abuse cases).
140.
See id. at 1314 (rejecting the government's argument that Craig should
govern).
141.
Id.
142.

Id. at 1315.

143.
Id. The Yates court did not use the precise words in the Confrontation
Clause, which grant an accused the right "to be confronted with" witnesses, rather than
a right "to confront" witnesses. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
144.
Yates, 438 F.3d at 1314; see also Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure(Apr. 29, 2002) (appendix to statement of Breyer, J.) [hereinafter
Proposed Rule 26(b)], http://www.fedcrimlaw.com/members/keyweb/FRCP-2002.pdf
(providing the text of the proposed amendment referenced in Yates).
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requesting party established (1) "exceptional circumstances for such
transmission", (2) the transmission used "appropriate safeguards",
and (3) the witness was otherwise "unavailable" to attend the trial in
person. 145 In its Committee Notes, the Advisory Committee
emphasized that Proposed Rule 26(b) should have satisfied the
various interests of the parties to the proceeding and also protected
the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. 14 6 However, as the
Eleventh Circuit emphasized in Yates, a majority of the Supreme
Court refused to approve the amendment, and it was not adopted.
However, it was not only the Supreme Court's refusal to
recommend the amendment that seems to have influenced the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Yates. The majority also seems to have
placed great weight on a separate statement filed by Justice Scalia,
wherein he indicated that the proposed amendment was of "dubious
validity under the Confrontation Clause."'1 47 Justice Scalia argued
that the Craig test should apply and limit the use of remote
testimony in criminal cases to instances in which there had been a
case-specific showing that it was "necessary to further an important
public policy.' 148 Of course, as the dissent in Yates pointed out,
Justice Scalia's statement has no official legal weight and may not
reflect the reasoning of the remaining Justices in the majority who
refused to recommend Proposed Rule 26(b). 14 9 Furthermore, although
the Yates majority makes no mention of it, Justices Breyer and
O'Connor filed a dissenting statement indicating that they failed to
see Confrontation Clause issues with the proposed amendment to

145.
Proposed Rule 26(b), supra note 144, at 7. The proposed rule defined
unavailability by reference to Rule 804(a)(4)-(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which essentially states that witnesses are unavailable either if they are dead or
infirm, or if the person seeking the witness's testimony is unable to procure it by
process or other reasonable means. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4)-(5). As one
commentator has noted, Proposed Rule 26(b) can be faulted for simply incorporating
Rule 804(a)'s standards of unavailability. For example, Rule 804(a)(4) deems a witness
unavailable if he is dead, but obviously a dead witness cannot testify remotely. See
Friedman, supra note 4, at 708-11 (explaining how Proposed Rule 26(b)'s incorporation
of Federal Rules of Evidence 804(a)(4)-(5) "breed[s] confusion").
146.
See Proposed Rule 26(b), supra note 144, at 8-12 (explaining how the rule's
various procedures and safeguards allow the amendment to be a "prudent and
measured step").
Yates, 438 F.3d at 1314-15 (quoting Proposed Rule 26(b), supra note 144, at
147.
1).
Id. at 1315 (quoting Proposed Rule 26(b), supranote 144, at 1-2).
148.
149.
Id. at 1324-25 n.8 (Tjoflat, Marcus & Birch, JJ., dissenting) (stating that
Justice Scalia's comments represent "nothing more than the legal musings of a
Supreme Court Justice on an issue that has yet to be briefed and argued in a case or
controversy before the Court"). In his dissent, Judge Tjoflat further remarked that
Justice Scalia's suggestion that the proposed amendment was of "dubious validity" is a
statement that "easily can be made of every constitutional challenge the Supreme
Court elects to hear." Id.
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Rule 26 since under Rule 15 the trial court could otherwise
constitutionally admit an absent witness's nonvisual deposition
testimony against a criminal defendant. 150 Nevertheless, it appears
that Justice Scalia's statement did persuade the Eleventh Circuit
that it should be wary of taking anything but a very strict approach
toward admitting remote video testimony.
Thus, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Yates court concluded
that prosecution witnesses could testify by remote two-way, live VCT
only when allowing that procedure would "further an important
public policy" and when "the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured. ' 151 Applying this test, the court found that the first prong
was not met in the case before it. 152 The district court had made casespecific findings that video testimony was necessary to further the
important public policies of (1) providing the fact finder with crucial
evidence from witnesses who were beyond the court's subpoena power
and otherwise unwilling to travel to the United States to testify and
(2) resolving the case expeditiously and justly. 1 53 The Eleventh
Circuit, however, held that although "presenting the fact-finder with
crucial evidence is, of course, an important public policy," under the
circumstances of the case, including the possibility of a Rule 15
deposition in Australia with all necessary parties present, 154 "the
prosecutor's need for the videoconference testimony to make a case
and to expeditiously resolve it are not the type of public policies that
are important enough to outweigh the Defendants' rights to confront

150.
See Proposed Rule 26(b), supra note 144, at 4 (statement of Breyer, J.) ("It
is not obvious how video testimony could abridge a defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights in circumstances where an absent witness' testimony could be admitted in
nonvisual form via deposition regardless.").
151.
Yates, 438 F.3d at 1314-15. Yates, however, was not a unanimous decision,
with three judges dissenting from the court's opinion. Id. at 1319-36 (Tjoflat, Birch &
Marcus, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1327-36 (Marcus, Tjoflat & Birch, JJ., dissenting).
152.
Id. at 1315-16 (majority opinion).
153.
Id.
154.
Id. at 1316. The court stated that the record did not provide any
evidentiary support explaining why the defendants and the witnesses could not all
participate in a pretrial deposition in Australia, especially given that under Rule 15,
the government must pay the cost of attendance for defendants who cannot themselves
afford to pay. Furthermore, although it addressed the fact that foreign countries have
refused entry to some defendants wishing to appear at Rule 15 depositions, it noted
there was no finding in this case showing that the defendants could not travel to
Australia to be present for a deposition. Id. at 1317-18 (referencing United States v.
McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 7-9 (1st Cir. 1997), wherein the defendant was not permitted to
attend a Rule 15 deposition because he was in custody and the United Kingdom
refused to assume temporary custody of him). As mentioned above, the court also
disagreed with the government that permitting the defendant to cross-examine
witnesses against him by two-way, live video testimony during trial in the presence of
the court and jury provided greater Confrontation Clause protections than did
permitting the defendant to attend an in-person, pretrial deposition. Id. at 1318.
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their accusers face-to-face. '155 Having thus decided that the first
prong of the Craig test was not met, the Yates court did not address
156
whether the reliability prong was satisfied.
3.

The Supreme Court After Craig: Some Confrontation Clause
Guidance, but No Resolution of the Circuit Split

Because the Supreme Court has not decided a case directly
addressing the question of whether and when the Confrontation
Clause permits the introduction of two-way, live VCT for adult
prosecution-witness testimony against defendants in criminal cases,
the exact formulation of any U.S. rule for allowing such testimony
remains unknown at this time. The Supreme Court has, however,
offered some additional guidance on the nature of the protections
afforded defendants by the Confrontation Clause. It has also issued a
statement in connection with a denial of a petition for certiorari
indicating that Craigmay not "obviously answer[ ]" whether two-way,
live VCT witness testimony is permissible in criminal cases. 15 7 Both
of these developments are discussed below.
First, in 2004, the Supreme Court decided Crawford v.
Washington, wherein it held that out-of-court testimonial statements
could only be admitted against a defendant in a criminal trial if the
witness was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination. 158 To reach its conclusion, the Crawford Court

155.
Id. at 1316.
156.
Id. at 1318. Contrary to the Yates court, but on similar facts, the Florida
Supreme Court applied the Craigtest and concluded that permitting two Argentine
nationals living in Argentina to testify remotely using two-way, live VCT did not
violate the defendant's confrontation rights. See Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.
1998). In Harrell, the court found three important public policies that would be
furthered by allowing the testimony: (1) the witnesses "lived beyond" the court's
subpoena power; (2) one witness was too sick to travel to the United States; and (3) the
testimony of these two victim-witnesses was essential to the case and necessary to the
important state interest in resolving criminal matters expeditiously and justly. Id. at
1369-70. It further concluded that the second part of the Craig test was satisfied
because (1) "the witnesses were placed under oath by a court clerk in Miami"; (2) the
defense was able to cross-examine the witnesses; and (3) the jury could observe the
witnesses and the witnesses could observe the jury during their testimony. Id. at 1371.
In reviewing a subsequent federal habeas petition, the Eleventh Circuit held (several
years before deciding Yates) that the Florida Supreme Court's application of the Craig
test to the facts before it did not violate clearly established federal law. Harrell v.
Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 931-32 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Horn v. Quarterman, 508
F.3d 306, 320 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding no violation of clearly established federal law
where trial court allowed terminally ill witness to testify by remote two-way VCT since
the state's interest in protecting seriously ill witnesses could satisfy Craig's necessity
prong).
157.
Wrotten v. New York, 130 S. Ct. 2520, 2520 (2010).
158.
See 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (explaining the demands of the Sixth
Amendment).
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overruled Ohio v. Roberts, which held that a hearsay declarant's outof-court statement could be admitted at trial against a defendant
without violating the Confrontation Clause as long as (1) the
declarant is "unavailable" to testify at trial and (2) the prior out-ofcourt statement bears "adequate indicia of reliability."159 Such
reliability under Roberts could be inferred when the evidence fell
within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or when the evidence was
shown to be otherwise trustworthy. 160 The Crawford Court, however,
held that reliability must be assessed "in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination"-as opposed to by some
161
judicial determination of reliability.
Although the Crawford decision dealt only with out-of-court
pretrial witness statements, some commentators have suggested that
the Confrontation Clause analysis in that case may implicitly limit
the Court's holding in Craig.162 Recall that Craigheld that a witness
could testify at trial outside the defendant's immediate presence
without violating the defendant's rights to be confronted with adverse
witnesses when "the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured"-a test that Crawford concluded was improper. 163 Those
commentators thus suggest that the Craig test for permitting
witnesses to testify outside of the direct presence of the defendant
might be constitutionally suspect after Crawford because the Craig
64
test uses a "reliability of the evidence" standard.1
While those commentators correctly point out the Crawford
Court's retreat from the "reliability" standard, there is nevertheless
reason to conclude that the Craig test is not constitutionally suspect.
Although the CraigCourt used the reliability language, its focus, like

159.
160.

448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
Id.

161.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62.

162.
See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, Today's Confrontation Clause (After Crawford
and Melendez-Diaz), 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 88-89 (2009) ("The problem with the
holding from Craig is that fourteen years later, in Crawford, the Court's interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause changed radically."); McAllister, supra note 89, at 868
(highlighting a particular passage in the Crawford case as a suggestion that "an
overwhelming majority of the current Supreme Court Justices would find the Craig
test constitutionally suspect").
163.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850-51 (1990). It bears noting, however,
that the Yates decision was rendered after the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford,
yet the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Craig test and did not suggest that Crawford had
rendered it inapplicable. In fact, the majority specifically stated that Crawford would
not govern the question of whether a prosecution witness could constitutionally testify
remotely during trial because it applies only to "testimonial statements made prior to
trial." United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1314 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
164.
McAllister, supra note 89, at 868; see also Fenner, supra note 162, at 88-89
(suggesting that Craig's holding was called into question by Crawfords Confrontation
Clause analysis, which indicated that "reliability of the testimony" can only be assured
by cross-examination, not by any other method).
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the Crawford Court, was on cross-examination as an important
component of reliability as relates to a defendant's rights pursuant to
the Confrontation Clause. 165 The Craig Court specifically stated that
permitting the witness to testify at trial by one-way video satisfied
Confrontation Clause concerns because in the absence of a face-toface confrontation, "the presence of the[] other elements of
confrontation-oath, cross-examination, and observation of the
witness' demeanor-adequately ensures that the testimony is both
reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner
166
functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony.'
Indeed, even the Gigante court focused on the defendant's ability to
cross-examine the witness who was testifying remotely in that case in
determining that the procedure satisfied Confrontation Clause
concerns. 16 7 Therefore, while commentators may be correct that the
Supreme Court will retreat from Craig's reliability of the evidence
standard post-Crawford, for the purposes of this Article one can
assume that cross-examination will remain an important-perhaps
the most important-factor in assessing whether the Confrontation
Clause is satisfied should a witness be permitted to testify by twoway, live VCT. It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to
predict the precise standard the Supreme Court will adopt to test the
admissibility of such testimony, if and when the Court is presented
with the question.
Indeed, it appears that the Supreme Court may be inclined at
some future date to take up the question, though its most recent
guidance indicates only that Craig may not provide the proper test for
determining when two-way, as opposed to one-way, remote video
testimony can be admitted without violating the Confrontation
Clause. In Wrotten v. New York, the Supreme Court denied a petition
for certiorari because of the interlocutory posture of the appeal. 168 In
a separate statement, however, Justice Sotomayor stated that the
petition presented the important question of whether a defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights "were violated when the State introduced
testimony at his trial via a two-way video that enabled the testifying
witness to see and respond to those in the courtroom, and vice
versa." 16 9 She explained that in Craig, the Court recognized that "a

165.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 851.
166.
Id.
167.
See United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that
the remote procedure used to present the witness's testimony preserved the
defendant's rights to confrontation since the witness was sworn; testified in view of the
jury, the court, defense counsel, and the defendant; and was subjected to crossexamination).
168.
Wrotten v. New York, 130 S. Ct. 2520, 2520 (2010).
169.
Id. In the underlying case from which the petition arose, the New York
Court of Appeals had concluded that (1) permitting an elderly and ill witness to testify
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defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied
absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial," but only upon a
case-specific finding that the denial of such confrontation is
"necessary to further an important public policy."170 Justice
Sotomayor concluded that the question raised in the petition was "not
obviously answered" by Craig because "the use of video testimony in
171
[Wrotten] arose in a strikingly different context than in Craig."
Although one could conclude from this statement that any new test
would be less restrictive since two-way remote video testimony more
closely simulates live, in-person testimony than one-way video
testimony does, Justice Sotomayor's statements are open to
interpretation. Again, it is beyond the scope of this Article-which is
focused broadly on proposing a test that can be used in courts
throughout the world-to predict what test the Supreme Court will
ultimately adopt for testing the constitutionality of permitting
prosecution witnesses to testify remotely by two-way, live VCT.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF MODERN MARITIME PIRACY AND THE
NEED TO ENCOURAGE STATES TO USE THE AVAILABLE

LAWS TO PROSECUTE PIRATES INSTEAD OF RELEASING THEM

Having outlined generally some approaches taken by various
international criminal courts and by federal courts in the United
States to analyze the issue of whether to permit adult prosecution
witnesses to testify remotely at trial using two-way, live VCT, this
Article now moves to a discussion of the modern piracy problem and
the reluctance of states to prosecute. In particular, it discusses how
issues relating to the difficulties associated with mounting cases of
such international proportions and which involve evidence, suspects,
victims, and witnesses from around the globe have negatively
impacted states' willingness to prosecute piracy cases. This Article

remotely by two-way, live VCT was necessary to further the important public policy of
protecting the well-being of such a witness so that criminal cases could be justly
resolved, and (2) the procedures employed ensured the reliability of the witness's
testimony. People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1101-03 (N.Y. 2009).
170.
Wrotten, 130 S. Ct. at 2520 (quoting Craig, 497 U.S. at 850) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
171.
Id. On May 27, 2010, the New York First Department Appellate Division
ruled on the pending issue that had prevented the Supreme Court from finding a "final
judgment" from which a petition for certiorari could be taken. People v. Wrotten, 901
N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see also Wrotten, 130 S. Ct. 2520 (denying
certiorari on interlocutory appeal in light of the procedural difficulties in reviewing the
case at that stage). The defendant thereafter filed another petition for certiorari, which
was also denied, but without any written statement. Wrotten v. New York, 131 S. Ct.
1020 (2011).
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further addresses how a rule allowing remote prosecution-witness
testimony in some circumstances can better facilitate the prosecution
of these cases and also encourage more states to undertake the
burden of bringing pirates to justice.
A. The Continuing Threat of Modern Maritime Piracy
The continuing threat of pirate attacks on ships and crews
makes traveling in the world's shared sea lanes increasingly
dangerous. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
Piracy Reporting Centre, between January 2007 and December 2011,
pirates staged some 1,850 attacks worldwide. 172 During the last three
years, the number of attacks has remained above 400 per year-a
number that exceeds the number of reported attacks in 2007 by
approximately 50 percent. 173 In fact, from January to March 2011,
reports showed that Somali pirates had already staged ninety-seven
attacks-more than one per day during that time period. 174 In
175
addition, most pirate attacks now involve the use of weapons.
Pirates used guns in 245 attacks in 2011 (more than half of the total
number of attacks that year), but they used guns in only seventy-two
attacks in 2007 (about 25 percent of the total number of attacks in
that year). 176 Nor are the attacks without victims. In 2007, pirates
held some 292 crew members hostage. But, in each year thereafter,
more than 800 crew members have been held captive while pirates
negotiated their release. 177 Finally, the ransoms paid to pirates "have
increased sevenfold in the last five years": average ransoms increased
from about $600,000 in 2007 to about $5 million in 2011.178 In other
words, over time, the threat of modern maritime piracy is increasing,
179
rather than decreasing.

172.
See ICC-IMB 2011 Report, supra note 11, at 5-6 (providing graphical
break-downs of piracy attacks between January 2007 and December 2011).
173.
Id.
174.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, REPORT,
2010-12, H.C. 1318, at 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012
REPORT].
175.
ICC-IMB 2011 Report, supra note 11, at 20.
176.
Id. at 11.
177.
Id. In total, between 2007 and 2011, pirates have held over 3,500 seafarers
hostage. They killed about sixty-two of their victims during that time period. FOREIGN
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at 16.
178.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at 55-56.
Some ransoms recently paid to Somali pirates have been significantly higher. For
example, in November 2010, a band of pirates was paid about $10 million in ransom to
release a South Korean supertanker, the Samho Dream. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Money
in PiracyAttracts More Somalis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, at A10.
179.
In fact, the number of actual pirate attacks is likely greater than the
number reported to the IMB since most believe that ship owners have incentives to
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Moreover, the threat of modern maritime piracy is broad in its
reach. As Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno explained, "[A] single
piratical attack affects the interests of numerous countries, including
the flag State of the vessel, various States of nationality of the
seafarers taken hostage, regional coastal States, owners' States, and
cargo shipment and transshipment States."'180 The evidence from
2011 alone supports the Rear Admiral's statement. The IMB reported
that in 2011, pirates attacked ships bearing the flags of fifty-six
different countries 81 in the waters off the coasts of Somalia,
Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore,
Vietnam,
Bangladesh, India, Benin, and Nigeria, among other places: 8 2 "As of
31 December 2011, suspected Somali pirates held 11 vessels for
ransom with 193 crew members of different nationalities as
83
hostage."1
A brief description of just two pirate attacks can help illustrate
the multinational reach of maritime piracy. On February 9, 2011,
pirates attacked the Greek supertanker MV Irene 900 miles off the
coast of Somalia. When attacked, the MV Irene was carrying 2 million
barrels of Kuwaiti oil destined for the United States and estimated to
be worth $200 million. The twenty-five-member crew included
seventeen Filipinos, seven Greeks, and one Georgian.18 4 Some two
months after being taken hostage, and after the pirates received an
astounding $13.5 million ransom payment, the ship, cargo, and crew
were released.18 5 On April 8, 2011, just one day after the hostages

underreport for fear their ships will be delayed for investigations or that their
insurance premiums will rise. See JOHN S. BURNETT, DANGEROUS WATERS: MODERN
PIRACY AND TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 181 (2003); PETER CHALK, THE MARITIME
DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: TERRORISM, PIRACY, AND CHALLENGES FOR

THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (2008) (noting several variables that are "directly relevant to
the general surge in piracy over the last fifteen years").
180.
PiracyAgainst U.S.-Flagged Vessels: Lessons Learned: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Mar. Transp. of the H. Comm. on Transp. &
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 79 (2009) (statement of Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno,
Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, Dep't of
Homeland Sec., U.S. Coast Guard).
181.
See ICC-IMB 2011 Report, supra note 11, at 15-16 (providing a graphic
breakdown of the various flag states that experienced pirate attacks between 2007 and
2011).

182.
Id. at 5-6.
183.
Id. at 20.
184.
E.g., EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, MV Irene SL Piratedin the North
Arabian Sea, EU NAVFOR (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.eunavfor.eul20ll/O2/mv-irene-slpirated-in-the-north-arabian-sea/; Tom Scott, Somali Pirates: Steep Rise in Attacks,
NEWS-INSURANCES (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.newsinsurances.co.uk/somali-piratessteep-rise-in-attacks/0169475872.
185.
Anna Bowden & Shikha Basnet, Oceans Beyond Piracy, The Economic Cost
of Somali Piracy 2011, at 11 (One Earth Future Foundation, Working Paper), available
at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economiccostofpiracy-2011.pdf.
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from the MV Irene were released, ten pirates stormed the MV Susan
K, a German cargo ship registered in Antigua & Barbuda. The MV
Susan K was attacked thirty-five miles off the coast of Oman while
travelling from Mumbai to Port Sudan with a crew that included four
Ukrainians and six Filipinos.1 86 Seventy days after being captured,
ransom
and after pirates received an approximately $4 million
8 7
payment, the MV Susan K and its crew were released.1
B. The InternationalLaw Authorizing Piracy Prosecutions
International law provides many legal tools for prosecuting acts
of maritime piracy. Piracy is the oldest crime to which universal
jurisdiction applies, 8 8 and all states may punish acts of piracy
occurring on the high seas even if the state has no specific nexus to
the offense.' 8 9 Exercising universal jurisdiction over acts of maritime
piracy is warranted because of the general heinousness of the crime
and the fact that it is directed against ships and persons of any and
all nations-disrupting international trade and commerce. 190 Thus,
states may use their own domestic laws to prosecute and punish
those who commit the crime of maritime piracy, regardless of the
nationalities of either the suspected pirates or their victims. 19 1

186.
Somali PiratesRelease Greek Owned VLCC, Hijack German Cargo Ship the
Next Day, MAR. EXECUTIVE (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.maritime-executive.com/
article/somali-pirates-release-greek-owned-vlcc-mv-irene-sl.
187.
Andrew Mwangura, Ransom Reported Paid for MV Susan K, SOMALIA REP.
(June 17, 2011), http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/981/Ransom- ReportedPaid forMVSusanK.
Universal jurisdiction is defined as "criminal jurisdiction based solely on
188.
the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the
nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any
other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction." THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES
ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001).
See Cohen, supra note 9, at 201 (explaining that the doctrine of universal
189.
jurisdiction was originally developed to address acts of maritime piracy occurring on
the high seas outside of any state's territorial jurisdiction).
190.
See, e.g., Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 794 (1988) (suggesting that the heinous nature of piracy
offenses, which involve violence and depredation, and the fact that piracy is directed
against ships of all nations, provide the most accurate rationale for allowing the
exercise of universal jurisdiction over piracy). In United States v. Cargo of Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the pirate as an
enemy of all mankind over whom states could exercise universal jurisdiction because
the pirate "commits hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all nations,
without any regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public authority." Id. at 232.
191.
See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47
VA. J. INT'L L. 149, 150-51 (2006) (highlighting the fact that universal jurisdiction
attaches to crimes of piracy); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 72 (9th
ed. 1783) (describing actions that have been historically deemed "piracy"); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdictionfor InternationalCrimes: HistoricalPerspectives and
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Universal jurisdiction over piracy offenses is codified in an
which most states
international treaty-the UNCLOS192-to
belong. 193 Pursuant to Article 105 of UNCLOS, any state may seize
pirate ships and arrest and prosecute pirates. 19 4 Article 101 lists the
acts which constitute piracy and over which states may exercise
universal jurisdiction as follows:
(a)

any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i)

on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft;

(ii)

against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b)

any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or
aircraft;

(c)

any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
in subparagraph (a) or (b).195

In addition, under Article 103, a ship is a pirate ship "if it is
intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the
purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in Article 101."196
In sum, UNCLOS essentially defines piracy as (1) an illegal act
of violence or detention, (2) committed for private ends, (3) on the
high seas, and (4) directed against another ship. 197 In addition, under
Article 100, states are actually required to cooperate in the repression

Contemporary Practice,42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 110-11 (2001) ("Positive international law
in the twentieth century has clearly established universal jurisdiction for piracy.").
192.
UNCLOS, supranote 10, arts. 100-108, 110.
193.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
194.
UNCLOS, supranote 10, art. 105.
195.
Id. art. 101.
196.
Id. art. 103.
197.
Although UNCLOS broadly defines piracy, it includes only those attacks
that occur on the high seas or outside the territory of any state. Id. art. 101(a). Thus,
UNCLOS is not applicable to attacks that occur in territorial waters and ports. In such
cases, only the nation in whose territory the attacks occurred will have jurisdiction to
prosecute using UNCLOS. See id. art. 2(2) ("The sovereignty of a coastal State
extends ... to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea."). Otherwise,
states would have to use other legal tools-such as the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)-to
prosecute acts of piracy that occurred in the territorial waters of another state. See
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation arts. 3, 6, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA Convention]
(defining piracy and the signatory states' jurisdictions).
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198
a mandate which in theory
of piracy to the fullest possible extent,
suggests they should assist in the arrest and prosecution of pirates.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
99
addresses
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)'
UNCLOS. 200
by
covered
not
violence
some additional acts of maritime
Drafted in response to the Achille Lauro incident when Palestinian
terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise liner,20 1 the SUA Convention
prohibits both completed attacks on ships and attempts to do the
same. 20 2 Under Article 3 of the SUA Convention, a prohibited offense
is committed by anyone who (1) "seizes or exercises control over20a3
ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation,
(2) "performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if
that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship,"20 4 or
(3) attempts to do any of the above. 20 5 Unlike UNCLOS, the SUA
Convention extends the definition of piracy to include attacks within
20 6
as long as the ship is
territorial or archipelagic waters or in 0port,
2 7
scheduled for international navigation.

UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 100 ("All States shall cooperate to the fullest
198.
possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside
the jurisdiction of any State.").
SUA Convention, supra note 197.
199.
See, e.g., Rapporteurs of the Defence Committee, The Role of the European
200.
Union in Combating Piracy, 12, 21, European Security and Defence Assembly,
Assembly of Western European Union, ESDA Doc. A/2037 (June 4, 2009) ("The SUA
Convention aims at suppressing unlawful acts against maritime safety ...not covered
");Joseph M. Isanga, Countering Persistent Contemporary Sea
by [UNCLOS] ....
Piracy: Expanding JurisdictionalRegimes, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1267, 1292 (2010) ("The
SUA [Convention] attempts to address forms of maritime violence that are not included
in the UNCLOS definition.").
Rosario Dominguez-Matbs, From the Achille Lauro to the Present Day: An
201.
Assessment of the InternationalResponse to Preventing and Suppressing Terrorism at
Sea, in

INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL

DIMENSION

OF TERRORISM

231

(Pablo Antonio

Fernbndez-Sbnchez ed., 2009); see also, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the
High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 269-72 (1988) (describing the Achille Lauro hijacking and the
incident's impact on maritime terrorism law).
See SUA Convention, supra note 197, art. 3 (establishing a number of
202.
offenses that involve the endangerment of ships, including attempts to commit any of
the listed offenses).
Id. art. 3(1)(a).
203.
Id. art. 3(1)(b).
204.
Id. art. 3(2)(a).
205.
Cf. id. art. 4 (extending the Convention's application to all ships scheduled
206.
to navigate beyond the territorial seas of a single state).
Id. Nevertheless, although the SUA Convention theoretically covers acts of
207.
violence against persons on a ship while in port, those acts must also be 'likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship." Id. art. 3(1)(b). Because of this language,
using the SUA Convention to prosecute attacks while a ship is docked may be difficult.
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On the other hand, in contrast to UNCLOS, the SUA Convention
does not provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 20 8 Only
signatory states may prosecute violations of the SUA Convention, and
they need some nexus to the offense in order to do so. States may only
prosecute using the SUA Convention when (1) the offense was against
a ship flying its flag, (2) the offense occurred in its territory, (3) the
offense was committed by a national of the state, or (4) a national of
the state was a victim of the offense. 20 9 Accordingly, if a signatory
state with the required nexus to the offense refuses to prosecute, or if
the states with a nexus to the offense have not ratified the SUA
Convention, pirates and maritime terrorists will go unpunished
notwithstanding the SUA Convention's increased territorial
210
coverage.
C. The Tendency to Release, Rather than Prosecute, Captured Pirates
Despite this international legal framework authorizing statesand, indeed, encouraging them-to prosecute maritime piracy
offenses, states are more inclined to release the pirates they capture
than to try them in their own domestic courts. Since 2008, numerous
states have provided ships, crew, money, and technology to support a
variety of naval forces that conduct counter-piracy operations in the
Gulf of Aden and the Indian Sea. The multinational naval force CTF150 was the first to conduct counter-piracy operations in late 2008. In
January 2009, it was replaced by another multinational naval force,
CTF-151. 211 In 2008, the European Union launched its own combined
naval force (Operation Atalanta) aimed at "deterr[ing], prevent[ing],
and repress[ing] acts of piracy and armed robbery" in the seas off the
coast of Somalia. 212 Since 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has sent ships to the Horn of Africa to conduct counterpiracy operations. 213 Other countries have independently sent their

208.
See, e.g., Isanga, supra note 200, at 1292 ("The SUA [Convention] ... did
not extend the scope of universal jurisdiction."); Eugene Kontorovich, Recent Case,
United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (2008), 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 734, 738 (2009) ("[T]he
SUA Convention does not create universal crimes.").
209.
SUA Convention, supra note 197, art. 6.
210.
See George D. Gabel, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an
International Solution to Modern-Day Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1445 (2007)
(discussing limits of jurisdiction granted by the SUA Convention).
211.
LAUREN PLOCH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40528, PIRACY OFF THE
HORN OF AFRICA 22 (2010), available at http://www.scribd.comdoc/47456778/Piracy-off-

the-Horn-of-Africa.Apr-2010-CRS-R40528.
212.
Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP, 2008 O.J. (L 330) 19-20 (EU), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServLexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:330:019:002O:EN:PDF
(approving Operation Atalanta).
213.
See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 211, at 23 (summarizing the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Ocean Shield).
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own naval forces to the region to provide escorts to ships and to
engage in antipiracy operations. 2 14 According to a recent report,
during 2011, "over 30 countries contributed military forces to counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean," and the
likely number of naval ships patrolling those areas on any given day
215
has been between ten and sixteen.
To their credit, the naval forces deployed by states have had
some success in both repressing pirate attacks and capturing pirates.
According to the report by Jack Lang, the UN Secretary-General's
Special Advisor on Legal Issues Relating to Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, naval forces "thwarted 126 attacks in 2008, 176 in 2009 and
127 in 2010."216 As for 2011, the IMB reports that although Somali
pirates apparently staged 237 attacks, the number of successful
hijackings decreased due, at least in part, to the naval forces'
antipiracy patrols. 217 Furthermore, the navies have captured many of
the pirates who attacked vessels at sea. Reports indicate that
between January and August 2009 alone, naval patrols captured 517
2 18
pirates and killed ten.
Yet, while the navies have contributed to a decrease in the rate
of successful hijackings, they have not been able to "contain the
growth in the overall number of attacks and the area in which pirates
can operate." 2 19 Many blame the prevalence of the navies' "catch and
release" policies to help explain why pirate attacks are not becoming
2 20
less frequent despite the antipiracy efforts of the world's navies.
For example, in 2008, the Danish navy released ten suspected Somali

214.
See id. (discussing the naval forces of India, China, and Russia).
215.
Bowden & Basnet, supra note 185, at 24-25.
216.
Lang, supra note 12, 39.
217.
ICC-IMB 2011 Report, supra note 11, at 20.
218.
PLOCH ET AL., supra note 211, at 22.
219.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at 3; see also
Lang, supra note 12, 39 (noting that the number of pirate attacks from 2007-2010
has continued to grow despite the presence of naval forces).
220.
See S.C. Res. 1918, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010) (stating that
"the failure to prosecute persons responsible for piracy and armed robbery at sea" was
undermining the international community's antipiracy efforts); U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Secretary-Generalon Possible Options To Further the Aim of
Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed
Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, Including, in Particular,Options for Creating
Special Domestic Chambers Possibly with International Components, a Regional
Tribunal or an International Tribunal and Corresponding Imprisonment
Arrangements, Taking into Account the Work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia, the Existing Practice in Establishing International and Mixed
Tribunals, and the Time and Resources Necessary To Achieve and Sustain Substantive
Results, 9, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter S/2010/394 Report] ("In
order to be effective, naval operations apprehending suspects should result in
prosecutions. The risk otherwise is that suspects are released at sea, or repatriated,
and return to commit further acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea.").
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pirates, even though they were armed and had notes on them stating
how they would split their piracy proceeds. 221 The United Kingdom's
and Canada's naval forces have both been accused of releasing
suspected pirates. 222 In fact, within a one-month period in 2010, the
United Kingdom's Royal Navy vessels found suspected pirates on
board three different motherships with hostages, but thereafter
22 3
released not only the hostages, but also the suspected pirates.
From mid-August to mid-December 2010, the European Union's naval
forces, Operation Atalanta, captured fifty-one suspected pirates
whom it immediately freed. 224 In May 2010, the United States
released ten pirates it had been holding for weeks after concluding
that no nation was willing to undertake the burden of prosecuting
them. 22 5 In fact, according to the Lang Report, only about one-third of
the pirates captured between 2008 and 2010 were prosecuted. 226 As
dismal as that number may seem, the numbers only get worse. Mr.
Lang explained that at the beginning of 2011, the rate of prosecution
had dropped to about 10 percent of captured pirates with "more than
90 per cent of the pirates apprehended by States patrolling the seas
[being] released without being prosecuted. '227 He emphasized that

221.
Paula Prada & Alex Roth, On the Lawless Sea, It's Not Easy Putting Somali
Pirates in the Dock, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122903542171799663.html; see also Oliver Hawkins, What To Do with a Captured
Pirate, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2009, 10:49 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7932205.stm
(discussing the 2008 capture and release of the ten pirates).
222.
See Canadian Warship Helps U.S.-Flagged Vessel Evade Pirates off
Somalian Coast, GUELPH MERCURY, May 22, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 9831454
(discussing Canada's lack of jurisdiction over suspected pirates); Jason Groves, Navy
Gives Somali Pirates Food and Water... Then Lets Them Sail off Scot Free,
MAILONLINE (Jan. 27, 2010, 7:46 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article1246300/Navy-gives-pirates.food-water--lets-sail-scot-free.html
(describing
several
incidents when suspected pirates were released).
223.
See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at Ev 4344 (questioning of Mr. Henry Bellingham, Minister of Parliament) (explaining why the
United Kingdom has not brought any pirates back to the United Kingdom for
prosecution).
224.
Lang, supra note 12, T 43.
225.
Craig Whitlock, Navy Releases Accused Somali PiratesHeld on Warship for
Six Weeks, WASH. POST (May 28, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.comlwpdyn/content/article2010/05/28/AR2010052804108.html.
226.
Lang, supra note 12, 43.
227.
Id. at
14. In his testimony before the UK Parliament, Minister
Bellingham suggested that the 90 percent release rate is somewhat misleading since
not all cases in which suspected pirates are captured would be worthy of prosecution
due to insufficient evidence that a crime has been committed. Captain David Reindorp
noted the difficulty of producing evidence of piracy in cases where suspected pirates are
caught near shore with AK47s, but no other evidence to prove they are pirates, as
opposed to simple fisherman carrying arms for protection. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at Ev 43-44 (discussing the challenges of
distinguishing between pirates, hostages, and fishermen). The United Kingdom's
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the "catch and release" policy has become the rule, rather than the
228
exception.
Thus, although the evidence indicates the naval fleets have
contributed to counter-piracy efforts, the full deterrent effect of those
resources likely cannot be realized absent a significant increase in
prosecution rates. 229 Consider, for example, how the 10 percent
prosecution rate might affect the cost-benefit calculations of an
ordinary Somali male making the decision of whether to become a
pirate. Some economists estimate that "the average pirate could earn
between $33,726 and $78,840 a year, depending on the ransom
paid"-an amount of money which far exceeds the $500 annual per
capita GDP of Somalia. 23 0 While the remuneration to pirates is
obviously higher than what a Somali male could otherwise earn,
being a pirate also includes some risks of death or imprisonment. But,
if the risks of imprisonment are as low as they are presently, the
decision to choose piracy necessarily becomes easier. 23 1 Indeed, the
"catch and release" policies send the message that "crime can pay,"
and the evidence shows that some pirates get that message inasmuch
as they return to the crime of piracy after they have been
apprehended and released. 23 2 The 2012 UK House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee Report makes the point well:

Foreign Affairs Committee, however, responded to the Minister's testimony by pointing
out:
[N]ot all claims made by the Government about the difficulty in securing
evidence were wholly convincing: when pirates are observed in boats with guns,
ladders and even hostages, it beggars belief that they cannot be prosecuted,
assuming that states have the necessary laws in place and the will to do so.
Id. at 45.
228.
See Lang, supra note 12,
43-44 (discussing the frequency at which
suspected pirates are released without prosecution).
229.
Deterrence and the prevention of future criminal activity are primary goals
of criminal prosecutions. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1007-08 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that deterrence is one of the "first purposes of
criminal law"); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for InternationalCrimes, 71
U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 410 (2000) (noting that one of the purposes of pursuing justice
and accountability is that doing so "contributes to the prevention and deterrence of
future conflicts").
230.
GEOPOLICITY, THE ECONOMICS OF PIRACY: PIRATE RANSOMS & LIVELIHOODS
OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA 12 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://www.geopolicity.com/
upload/content/pub_1305229189_regular.pdf.
231.
See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at 3
("[The risk to pirates of serious consequences is still too low to outweigh the lucrative
rewards from piracy.").
232.
See Lang, supra note 12,
14 (stating that some of the very pirates who
were previously apprehended and released have thereafter been identified as repeat
offenders).
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[S]imply returning suspected pirates to their boats or to land ...may
temporarily disrupt their activities, [but it] provides little long term
deterrence and has demonstrably failed to prevent an annual increases
[sic] in both the number of pirates going to sea and in the number of
23 3
attacks.

D. The Need to EncourageMore PiracyProsecutions
by ImprovingAccess to Witness Testimony
Increasing the present ratio of prosecutions as compared to
releases can help guarantee that more suspected pirates are brought
to justice. It should also help to deter future acts of piracy because
increasing prosecution rates will also increase the potential costs of
engaging in piracy. As discussed above, the current policy which
allows the world's navies to catch and release suspected pirates
appears insufficient to stem the threat modern maritime piracy poses
to innocent seafarers.
Of course, there are many reasons states may not want to
assume the burden of prosecuting piracy cases, some of which have
been examined by the author in previous projects. States may fear
that if they prosecute pirates in their own territory, any convicted
pirates may thereafter seek asylum. 234 States have also claimed that
they do not have the necessary national laws to prosecute acts of
piracy. 235 However, as demonstrated above, international law
authorizes states to prosecute acts of piracy even when the state has
no particular nexus to the offense. 236 Accordingly, while the author's
own research confirms that some states do not in fact have sufficient
national laws enabling them to exercise universal jurisdiction over
piracy, the author also concludes there is no particular reason-other
than a lack of political will-to explain why states do not, or cannot,
2 37
have such laws.
This Article addresses the other frequently cited reason to
explain why states are not inclined to undertake piracy prosecutions:

233.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at 40.
234.
See Yvonne M. Dutton, Pirates and Impunity: Is the Threat of Asylum
Claims a Reason To Allow PiratesTo Escape Justice?,34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 236, 29295 (2011) (analyzing the texts of several treaties governing asylum and nonrefoulement and concluding that even if there is some small risk that some pirates will
be able to claim asylum or other benefits, the problem of maritime piracy is so great
that developed nations should assume the risk of those additional asylum claims and
hold pirates accountable for their crimes).
235.
See Yvonne M. Dutton, Maritime Piracy and the Impunity Gap: Insufficient
National Laws or a Lack of Political Will?, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1111, 1133-39 (discussing
states' reluctance to prosecute pirates and their failure to implement international
piracy conventions).
236.
See supra Part TV.B.
237.
Dutton, supra note 235, at 1159-62.

1328

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45:1283

the difficulty and cost of trying cases of an international character
that require the state to collect evidence and produce witnesses from
different parts of the globe. 238 As noted in Part V.A. above, a single
pirate attack can involve victims (such as ship owners, cargo owners,
and seafarers) from a number of different countries. For countries
that require or prefer live witness testimony, undertaking piracy
prosecutions is more costly and difficult than it would be if witnesses
could, for example, provide their testimony in writing. 239 And,
because states can prosecute-and are encouraged to prosecutepiracy crimes using universal jurisdiction even when they have no
direct nexus to the attack, states could find that few, if any, witnesses
whose evidence they need for a trial will be state nationals. Even if
those witnesses were to agree to travel from their home state and
testify at the trial in person, the prosecuting state would still have to
incur the burden of paying the travel costs of those witnesses.
Paying travel costs, however, may be a moot issue in many cases
because states ordinarily cannot actually compel foreign witnesses to
appear at trials. As seasoned federal prosecutor Lynn Helland
explains, prosecutors in the United States can only subpoena U.S.
citizens or residents to testify live at criminal trials. 240 But U.S.
courts have no subpoena powers over citizens of foreign countries
when they are outside the United States. 241 Prosecutors may still be
able to require some foreign witnesses to provide necessary evidence
if the United States has entered into a treaty or other agreement with
the witness's country by which the foreign country will help obtain
that evidence. Even with a treaty, however, the foreign witness
cannot be compelled to travel to testify in person; the evidence would
be provided in writing, or by some other means. 242 Likewise, the
United Kingdom cannot compel foreign witnesses to testify at

238.
See supra Part IV.C.
239.
According to the Lang Report, most countries where maritime piracy cases
have been brought follow a common-law legal tradition and generally require or prefer
in-person witness testimony. See Lang, supra note 12, 61 (discussing the challenges
presented by live testimony requirements).
240.
See Helland, supra note 2, at 724 & n.20 (noting that pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1783(a), U.S. citizens or residents are subject to a court's subpoena power even if they
are located outside the country). However, citizens of a foreign country may be served
with a subpoena while on U.S. soil. Id.
241.
Martin Davies, Bypassing the Hague Evidence Convention: Private
InternationalLaw Implications of the Use of Video and Audio Conferencing Technology
in TransnationalLitigation, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 232 (2007); see also Helland, supra
note 2, at 724 (stating that citizens of foreign countries can only be compelled to testify
in U.S. courts if they can be served with a subpoena while in U.S. territory or if an
applicable international agreement exists).
242.
See Helland, supra note 2, at 724 (describing the limitations of U.S.
authorities' ability to compel witness testimony).
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trials.2 43 In short, in the context of maritime piracy cases, courts
could find that many witnesses are beyond their subpoena power,
meaning that valuable evidence will be lost unless there is some other
way to secure the testimony of those witnesses.
Moreover, there are many reasons why foreign witnesses may
not be willing to actually travel to the prosecuting state to give their
testimony in person. Some witnesses may be more fearful of reprisals
244
should they be seen testifying in person against suspected pirates.
Some witnesses, such as crew members and naval officers, may
conclude that taking leave from work to travel to testify would
unnecessarily risk the security of their employment-even if some
laws may supposedly require their employers to make them available
to testify and to pay their wages while doing so. 245 Other witnesses
may be too ill to travel. 246 In all of these cases, the state can only
hope to persuade the foreign witness to travel to testify since it likely
has no power to subpoena a trial appearance. In fact, one of the
United Kingdom's naval officers pointed to the unwillingness of
witnesses to travel to testify live at trials in an effort to explain, in
part, why the United Kingdom had yet to bring any of the pirates it
captured back to be prosecuted.2 47 He testified that victims of pirate
attacks often claim they do not want to go anywhere to testify against
the pirates and that the United Kingdom could not compel foreign
248
nationals to travel from their home countries to testify.
States may be able to persuade some foreign witnesses to attend
a trial to testify so that justice may be done. Some foreign witnesses,
in fact, must have committed to making themselves available in the
various piracy cases that states have prosecuted. 249 Nevertheless, it

243.

See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at Ev 44-

45 (testimony of Captain David Reindorp) (explaining that the United Kingdom cannot
compel noncitizen hostages to travel to the United Kingdom to testify against the
pirates who held them captive).
See Lang, supra note 12, 62 (stating that many victims sometimes fear
244.
giving live testimony).
61-62 (suggesting that Security Council resolution 1950 provides
245.
See id.
that seafarers must be given an opportunity to give evidence in piracy trials and that
employers should enshrine that right in the contracts of seafarers).
246.
See, e.g., Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364, 1370 n.6 (Fla. 1998) (positing
that a witness may be too ill to appear away from home in person but may be able to
testify via teleconference).
247.

See, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at Ev 44-

45 (testimony of Captain David Reindorp) (discussing the difficulties of identifying and
prosecuting suspected pirates).
248.
Id.
249.
For example, data from 2011 indicates that approximately twenty countries
have prosecuted, or are in the process of prosecuting, at least one piracy case, and it
seems reasonable to assume that not all potential witnesses are nationals of the
prosecuting state. See Bowden & Basnet, supra note 185, at 23 (listing countries
holding piracy trials).
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remains true that states exercising universal jurisdiction over piracy
cases will likely find that they cannot compel foreign witnesses to
attend a trial in the prosecuting state-again, meaning that some
evidence will be lost, and some pirates may escape justice as a result.
Even in cases where the foreign witnesses voluntarily agree to
appear, they may not make themselves available in a timely fashion.
Thus, trial delays can be common while courts await witness
testimony, a fact that can prejudice the suspected pirates awaiting
their day in court. Indeed, Mr. Lang notes in his report that as of
early 2011, about 100 suspected pirates were in temporary detention
for as many as two years while awaiting sentencing or witness
250
testimony.
The costs and the difficulties associated with obtaining the
necessary evidence to prosecute maritime piracy cases can be
mitigated if courts in those countries requiring or preferring live
witness testimony adopt a more flexible rule that allows some
witnesses to testify remotely under certain circumstances. Although
foreign witnesses could still not be compelled to testify, states should
find it easier to persuade them to testify remotely. After all, by
testifying remotely, the witness could avoid the risks and
inconveniences that accompany travel and live, in-person testimony
in a foreign locale. In addition, states would save the costs of funding
witness travel. For all of these reasons, states should also be more
willing to assume the burden of prosecuting piracy cases that do not
involve their own nationals as direct victims of the attack, thereby
reducing the catch-and-release tendency that currently prevails. In
fact, Mr. Lang and the House of Commons of the United Kingdom
have both encouraged the potential use of two-way, live VCT as a way
to alleviate the difficulties associated with obtaining the necessary
evidence to successfully prosecute maritime piracy cases.
Part V describes and discusses the author's proposed rule to
allow two-way, live VCT witness testimony in maritime piracy trials
under certain circumstances.

V. A PROPOSAL TO ALLOW TwO-WAY, LIVE VCT WITNESS
TESTIMONY IN MARITIME PIRACY TRAILS

Courts should allow witnesses to testify by two-way, live VCT
maritime piracy trials on a case-by-case basis in the interests
justice, upon proof by the requesting party that (1) the testimony
necessary to the fair and just resolution of the case, (2) the witness
unable or unwilling for good reason to travel to the court to testify

250.

Lang, supra note 12,

61.

in
of
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is
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person, and (3) the transmission will use appropriate safeguards to
protect the defendant's rights to a fair trial and to ensure the witness
understands his obligation to give truthful testimony. The test is not
meant to replace any preference for live testimony, but it should
facilitate obtaining evidence in piracy cases in particular instances in
which live testimony is simply not a real alternative. Furthermore,
the test seeks to ensure that remote testimony is only admitted where
it would be in the interests of justice to proceed remotely and when
the technology and the circumstances at the remote location replicate
as much as possible the courtroom experience, so as to protect the
public's and the defendant's interests in a fair trial. The rule
addresses only two-way, live VCT-a mode of technology that will
permit all parties in the courtroom and in any remote location to see
and hear one another at all times. As a result, although the witness is
at a remote location, the defendant will still be able to cross-examine
the witness contemporaneously during the trial proceedings and in
view of the judge and jury.
The proposed test is designed so that remote witness testimony
will be permitted only when the court deems it necessary and proper.
It requires a case-specific determination and balances the interests of
the various parties to the proceeding in deciding whether allowing a
particular prosecution witness to testify by remote VCT is in the
interests of justice. 25 1 It considers the public's interest in ensuring
that trials of serious international crimes can proceed with the
evidence necessary to a fair and just resolution of the case. It
considers the need to protect witnesses against risks or
inconveniences associated with having to attend a trial in person.
Finally, it considers the defendant's rights to a fair trial, including
the right to hear and cross-examine contemporaneously the witnesses
against him-witnesses who are also aware of their obligation to
speak truthfully. Each prong of the proposed test is discussed in more
detail below.

251.
See, e.g., supra Part II.A (describing the various tests used by the
international criminal courts, all of which permit remote VCT testimony only when in
the interests of justice and where the court determines, for example, that the witness is
unable or unwilling to attend the trial, the testimony is important, and the accused is
not prejudiced in his right to cross-examine or confront the witness); supra Part
III.B.1.b. (describing the Craig test, which requires a showing of an important public
policy, unavailability of the witness, and that the procedure ensures the evidence is
reliable-including that cross-examination is permitted); supra Part II.B.2 (describing
the Gigante test, which permitted remote VCT testimony in the interests of justice in
light of exceptional circumstances-namely, whether the testimony was material, the
witness was unavailable, and the defendant's confrontation rights were still protected).
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A. Testimony Necessary to the Fairand Just Resolution of the Case
The first prong of the proposed test is designed to protect the
interest of the court and the public in ensuring that trials can proceed
with the evidence necessary to a fair and just resolution of the case.
To be able to testify remotely, the witness's testimony must be
sufficiently important to proving or disproving the defendant's guilt.
At the same time, however, the proposed test provides a method for
courts to obtain that necessary evidence so that maritime piracy
trials can go forward and also be resolved. The ICTY and ICTR both
expressly consider the importance of the witness's testimony in
determining whether to permit remote prosecution testimony.2 52 The
Gigante court similarly considered whether the witness's testimony
was material in applying its "exceptional circumstances" test to the
question of remote adult prosecution-witness testimony. 25 3 Courts
applying the Craig test likewise indicated that obtaining crucial
evidence necessary to justly and expeditiously resolving criminal
matters can satisfy the "public policy" prong of that test. For example,
in Harrell v. State, the Florida Supreme Court found that two
Argentinean witnesses possessed necessary evidence and that their
testimony was essential to the important state interests in resolving
criminal matters. 254 Notwithstanding that it concluded that
permitting the remote witness testimony in Yates was improper, even
the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the "[g]overnment's interest in
presenting the fact-finder with crucial evidence is, of course, an
important public policy. '255 Indeed, as the Yates dissent pointed out,
"providing the fact-finder with reliable testimony and justly resolving
the case are the same public policies that were found important
25 6
enough to warrant the one-way procedure approved in Craig."
The international community as a whole should have an interest
in making certain that states have the necessary evidence to mount
maritime piracy trials. As discussed above, piracy poses an everincreasing threat to individuals, as well as to the safety and security
of the world's shared sea lanes and the important resources that
travel through those seas. 257 In fact, in an executive order dated April
12, 2010, President Barack Obama stated that acts of piracy and

252.
See supra Part I11.A.1-2 (outlining the ICTY's and ICTR's criteria for
allowing remote testimony).
253.
See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text (discussing the application
of the "exceptional circumstances" test).
254.
See supra note 156 (discussing the Harrell case).
255.
United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
256.
Id. at 1322 (Tjoflat, Marcus, & Birch, JJ., dissenting).
257.
See supraPart IV.A.
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armed robbery off the coast of Somalia posed an "extraordinary threat
258
to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."
The UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee recently made
a similar point, explaining that piracy threatens the United
Kingdom's economy and security; it affects the country's "banking,
insurance and shipping industries, and threatens the large volume of
goods which are transported to the [country] by sea."25 9 There is little
hope that the threat posed by maritime piracy can be halted or
pirates deterred unless states can obtain the evidence necessary to
prosecute pirates who attack innocent seafarers and hold them and
the world's goods hostage.
B. Witness Unable or Unwilling for Good Reason to Testify in Person
The second prong of the proposed test considers the interests of
the witness and witness availability. As discussed in Part IV.D,
because maritime piracy is a universal-jurisdiction crime that any
state can prosecute without any nexus to the offense, piracy trials can
necessarily involve witnesses who are not state nationals. Therefore,
the possibility of remote testimony in maritime piracy trials is
important because many witnesses will likely be beyond the state's
subpoena power or otherwise unwilling to travel great distances at
great potential cost to their health, safety, or job security to testify
live at a trial in a foreign country.
Furthermore, given the nature of piracy trials and the types of
witnesses who may have necessary evidence, this prong's "unable or
unwilling for good reason" language should be broadly interpreted.
The case law in the international criminal courts and in the United
States establishes that a witness's poor health or other health
condition, such as pregnancy, is a well-established reason for
granting a request to testify by video. 260 Case law also shows that
courts frequently conclude that safety or other concerns that make
witnesses extremely vulnerable should they have to testify live in
front of the defendant constitute valid reasons to grant a request to

258.
Exec. Order No. 13,536, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 12, 2010); Exec. Notice,
76 Fed. Reg. 19,897 (Apr. 7, 2011) (continuing Executive Order 13,536). See generally
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Testimony to the U.S. H.R. Foreign Affairs Subcomm.
on Int'l Orgs., Human Rights and Oversight (May 14, 2009), available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/enlabout-unodc/speeches/2009-14-05.html (discussing the
threat of Somali piracy to the stability of the region, and the commercial and security
interest of UN Member States).
259.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 174, at 5.

260.
See, e.g., supra notes 39, 54, 68, 126 and accompanying text (discussing
pertinent case law).
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testify remotely. 26 1 Like the ICC, however, courts should decline to be
constrained regarding the circumstances under which they may find
a witness has good reasons for being unwilling to attend a trial in
person. 26 2 Indeed, some courts have found that job-related difficulties
are sufficient to establish witness unavailability when considering a
request to allow remote testimony. 2 63 In the piracy context, it is quite
conceivable that concerns relating to job security will prompt some
witnesses to conclude that testifying in a foreign country is too risky.
As the Lang Report notes, some victims and witnesses of piracy
attacks have refused to testify because they are afraid their
employers would not give them time off.264 Naval personnel may also
have some difficulty leaving their tours of duty for the time it might
take to travel from sea to a foreign location to testify in person at a
26 5
trial.
Witnesses should also be deemed unable or unwilling for good
reason to testify at trial in person when they are beyond the subpoena
power of the foreign court and cannot be persuaded to travel. While it
is true that some nations may have procedures like the Rule 15
deposition procedure sometimes used in the United States to preserve
the evidence of witnesses who may be unavailable at trial, these
procedures are cumbersome and costly. Moreover, despite the
Eleventh Circuit's comments in Yates, there is reason to believe that
a Rule 15 deposition procedure is not as protective of a defendant's
rights as the two-way, live VCT procedure. After all, the Rule 15
procedure allows some depositions to go forward without the
and does
not permit
defendant's
in-person
participation
contemporaneous cross-examination at trial. This Article discusses
these points in more detail below.
First, even if a nation has procedures similar to Rule 15's, those
procedures can be cumbersome. As the dissent in Yates pointed out,
arranging Rule 15 depositions is difficult because one has to deal with
travel to a foreign state. Those arrangements, even if ultimately

261.
See, e.g., supra notes 55, 81 and accompanying text (discussing pertinent
case law).
262.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the ICC's willingness
to allow video testimony when the witnesses' personal circumstances encourage it).
263.
See, e.g., supra notes 58, 86 and accompanying text (discussing pertinent
case law).
264.
See Lang, supra note 12, 1 61 (discussing the impediments to in-person
testimony).
See, e.g., Standards of Military Commissions and Tribunals: Testimony
265.
Before the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (2006) (statement of Gerald Gahima,
Senior Fellow, U.S. Inst. of Peace), available at http://www.usip.org/publications/
practice-international-criminal-tribunals-and-their-relevance-military-com missionslight-h (noting that substitutes for requiring the live trial testimony of military
commanders, for example, can help in the situation where those persons need to
remain in the field working).
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successful, can take time and will likely result in trial delays to the
prejudice of all parties to the proceeding. 266 When the suspect is in
custody, those arrangements become even more burdensome. Foreign
countries do not need to permit suspects who are accused of violent
crimes and in custody onto their soil and into their own temporary
custody. 2 67 And, in the piracy context, it would not be unusual for
suspects to be in state custody while awaiting trial given the nature
of the violent crimes pirates commit and the fact that the pirates will
often not be nationals of the prosecuting state. Accordingly, while
taking a deposition of the witness in his home country may be an
alternative in some cases, when the defendant cannot attend the
deposition, the procedure seems particularly inferior to permitting
the witness to testify remotely at the trial.
Second, a deposition that occurs some years, months, or weeks
before the actual trial does not provide the same rights of
contemporaneous cross-examination, or even confrontation, as does
the opportunity to question a witness who appears at the trial by twoway, live VCT. This Part discusses in greater detail below the various
ways in which two-way, live VCT mirrors the trial experience when
witnesses testify in person. One benefit two-way, live VCT has over
procedures allowing for the introduction of previously recorded
deposition testimony is that the defense can tailor its crossexamination of prosecution witnesses to what it has learned about the
268
prosecution's case from all of the other evidence produced at trial.
Finally, Rule 15 deposition procedures can be costly for the state.
In the maritime piracy context, those costs could be quite substantial
since many witnesses with relevant and necessary evidence will likely
live in foreign jurisdictions. Not all states will have the resources to
fund foreign travel for depositions, and even states with sufficient
resources are unlikely to want to fund such travel. States are not
embracing their duty to prosecute piracy cases using universal
jurisdiction. They are unlikely to change their current behavior
unless mounting such prosecutions becomes less-rather than moreburdensome.
It is true that states may not be able to persuade all witnesses
who are beyond their court's subpoena powers to testify remotely by
two-way, live VCT. Nevertheless, there can be no question that
remote testimony is less of a burden on the witness than traveling to
a foreign state to testify in person. Thus, it should be the case, as the

266.
United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(Tjoflat, Marcus & Birch, JJ., dissenting).
267.
See United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing the
difficulties involved in arranging the testimony of a foreign defendant).
268.
See id. at 8. (noting that a court would want to consider the importance of
having testimony given in the context of the trial, rather than at some earlier date).
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international criminal courts and courts in the United States have
found, that many witnesses will agree to suffer the inconvenience of
testifying remotely in order help bring pirates to justice.
C. Transmissionand Other Safeguards to Protect
Defendant's Fair-TrialRights
The third and final part of the proposed test focuses on the
interest in ensuring that the trial is fair from the perspective of the
defendant-and, indeed, the public. It addresses concerns relating to
protecting the defendant's right to be confronted by and be able to
cross-examine witnesses who testify against him. It also addresses
the need to have other safeguards in place at the remote site so that
the witness can testify freely, but with the understanding that
testimony must be given truthfully.
First, because the proposed rule contemplates only two-way, live
VCT, it already guarantees that the remote testimony will replicate
in-person testimony at trial better than one-way modes of
transmitting testimony. The two-way, live VCT technology allows
testifying witnesses to see and respond to questioning by courtroom
participants. The courtroom participants can also see, hear, and
respond to the witness. Indeed, the international criminal courts have
concluded that defendants' cross-examination rights are not
compromised when witnesses testify remotely by two-way, live VCT
because the technology permits the defense to examine the witness
269
contemporaneously during the witness's remote testimony at trial.
Moreover, even in the United States, the Supreme Court has stated
that the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee defendants "the
absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them
at trial. '270 Two-way, live VCT ensures that the defendant can still
cross-examine the witnesses against him, thus satisfying what the
Supreme Court has stated to be the most fundamental right protected
271
by the Confrontation Clause.

269.
See, e.g., supra note 44 and accompanying text (quoting the ICTY as stating
that videoconferencing "respects the right of the accused to cross-examine and directly
confront witnesses while observing their reactions"); supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text (explaining that the ICC has concluded that a defendant's rights to
cross-examine witnesses would not be compromised where a witness was subject to
contemporaneous cross-examination during remote testimony).
270.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990); see also Kweku Vanderpuye,
Traditions in Conflict: The Internationalizationof Confrontation, 43 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 513, 536 (2010) (suggesting that the United States is virtually alone in viewing
confrontation as something of a categorical imperative even where there are other
competing factors that show the overall fairness of the trial proceedings).
271.
See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (explaining Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 61-62 (2006)).
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It is true that not all courts appear to agree that remote witness
testimony sufficiently replicates the experience of live testimony in
the courtroom. The Yates majority stated the "simple truth" that
"confrontation through a video monitor is not the same as physical
face-to-face confrontation." 272 Although that statement is necessarily
true since the two methods of testifying are not "identical," the other
"simple truth" is that the Supreme Court has stated that the
Confrontation Clause does not absolutely guarantee face-to-face
confrontation. 2 73 Indeed, the Craig Court found that permitting a
child witness to testify by one-way, closed-circuit television did not
violate the defendant's confrontation rights. Here, the two-way, live
VCT procedure more closely simulates the experience of live
courtroom testimony than the one-way procedure does since the
witness and courtroom participants can see each other. 274 As
previously noted, Professor Lederer has suggested that with
improvements in technology, one may have difficulty observing that a
27 5
remote witness is not actually physically present at the trial.
In addition to the question of the defendant's ability to
adequately cross-examine or confront a remote witness, some courts
have questioned whether courtroom participants can adequately
assess the demeanor of a remote witness. For example, one chamber
of the ICTR refused to permit an important witness to testify
remotely, citing concerns that it would be unable to sufficiently
276
observe the witness's demeanor-and thus determine credibility.
The chamber's comment, however, should be considered alongside the
decisions of many other courts admitting two-way, live VCT after
concluding that allowing such testimony would still protect the
defendant's rights to a fair trial. Although remote testimony is used
less frequently in criminal cases, its more regular use in civil cases
suggests that courts are comfortable that the technology can
sufficiently convey the image and voice of witnesses to the trier of
fact. 277 In any event, there is little reason to believe that judges and
juries cannot assess a witness's demeanor equally well on video as in

272.
See supra text accompanying note 142.
273.
Craig,497 U.S. at 844.
274.
See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(Marcus, Tjoflat & Birch, JJ., dissenting) (discussing the benefits of the two-way
procedure); see also United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 242 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating,
in a case where witnesses were deposed from Saudi Arabia with defendant in the
United States, that the two-way, live deposition procedures used were in some ways
more protective of the defendant's confrontation rights than the procedures used in
Craig).
275.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
276.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
277.
See, e.g., supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing the various
uses of VCT in foreign and domestic courts).
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person. In fact, the videoconference procedure may offer the fact
finder a better view of the witness depending on the size of the video
screen and its placement. 278 Moreover, some studies have shown that
jurors tend to perceive remote witnesses very much like they perceive
witnesses who testify live in the courtroom. 27 9 Because people around
the world are increasingly using video technology to communicate
with each other for personal and other reasons, one may expect that
judges and jurors will only become increasingly comfortable viewing
witnesses remotely.
Finally, the proposed rule only authorizes the use of two-way,
live VCT in the interests of justice when steps are taken to make sure
the witness at the remote location understands the obligation to give
truthful testimony. Accordingly, just as the international criminal
tribunals required that witnesses testify in locations such as
courtrooms or embassies, so too should courts require remote
witnesses in maritime piracy trials to appear at a location that will
convey the seriousness of the proceeding. 28 0 To guarantee that the
witness is not coached at the remote location, courtroom officials or
some other neutral officer should oversee remote proceedings. In
addition, courts could allow the parties to send a representative to the
remote location to act as observers should they wish to do so.281
Implementing these procedures in a foreign location will require the
assistance of foreign governments. However, because maritime piracy
is harming the international community as a whole, and because the
foreign state should be grateful another state has assumed the
burden of prosecution, one should expect some cooperation from
states. Moreover, most states are parties to UNCLOS and have
agreed to cooperate to the fullest extent possible in the repression of
piracy. 28 2 Even though the treaty contains no mechanism to enforce
this obligation, the prosecuting state could reference this obligation in
an effort to obtain the cooperation of other states to assist in
facilitating remote witness testimony.
Finally, so that the remote witness understands the obligation to
testify truthfully, the trial court and the courtroom official or other
neutral officer should place the witness under oath and inform him

278.
See Yates, 438 F.3d at 1334 (Marcus, Tjoflat & Birch, JJ., dissenting)
(noting that the videoconference procedure may make the witness's image easier for
the fact finder to observe than had the witness testified in person).
279.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
280.
See supra text accompanying note 47 (discussing ICTY guidelines for the
orderly conduct of VCT); supra text accompanying notes 73-76 (discussing SCSL
safeguards for remote witness testimony).
281.
See supra text accompanying notes 73-76 (allowing for a court
representative to be present in a remote courtroom).
282.
See supra text accompanying note 198 (discussing states' obligations under
UNCLOS).
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that failure to tell the truth could result in a prosecution for perjury
or other criminal punishment. 28 3 Of course, each state's perjury laws
may differ, but many should be sufficient to subject the witness to a
perjury prosecution. It bears noting that the Yates and Harrell trial
courts administered oaths to the foreign witnesses in Australia and
Argentina, respectively. 28 4 Furthermore, like the extradition treaty
between the United States and Argentina discussed in Harrell, other
countries likely have extradition treaties that provide for extradition
for the crime of perjury.

VI. CONCLUSION

Allowing the use of two-way, live remote witness VCT in
maritime piracy cases on a case-by-case basis when the proposed rule
is satisfied should help to facilitate the prosecution of these cases and
help end the impunity gap that currently prevails. States would not
have to be worried that they could never obtain the evidence
necessary to successfully mount a piracy case because they could offer
witnesses the possibility of testifying remotely. The rule ensures that
courts permit remote prosecution-witness testimony only when it
would further the interests of justice and also protect the defendant's
rights to a fair trial. The witness's evidence has to be sufficiently
important, so that it is necessary to the fair and just resolution of the
case. The witness has to be unable or unwilling to attend the trial for
good reason-such as a foreign witness beyond the subpoena power of
the state or a witness who would suffer health or job-related risks
should he be required to attend a trial in person. Furthermore, even
though the witness would not be in the courtroom, the two-way, live
VCT technology enables all parties-whether in the courtroom or the
remote location-to see and hear one another so that defense counsel
can subject the witness to real-time cross-examination and so that the
courtroom participants can assess the witness's demeanor at the
same time.
The technology necessary to permit two-way, live VCT remote
witness testimony is not without cost. However, as noted above, the
international criminal courts and the courts in many developed
nations are already using the technology. 285 To the extent that less-

283.
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990) (discussing the rights
guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause).
284.
United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc);
Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364, 1371 (Fla. 1998).
285.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts
that use VCT); see also Heru Andriyanto, Court To Allow Video Link Testimony in
Bashir Trial, JAKARTA GLOBE (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com
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developed nations do not have the technology or the necessary funds
to obtain it, wealthier nations could assist. After all, the world
community is spending more than $1 billion each year to support the
antipiracy efforts of the various patrolling navies. 28 6 Nations are also
providing funds to assist Kenya and the Seychelles in developing
28 7
their courts and prisons so that they can aid in prosecuting pirates.
There seems little reason not to spend some funds on helping nations
obtain the technology to allow witnesses to testify remotely using
VCT if doing so would also encourage those nations to share the
burden of prosecuting piracy cases.
The international community must seek solutions, and
sometimes novel solutions, if it hopes to put an end to the current
situation in which pirate attacks are ever-increasing in number, in
violence, and in payoffs to pirates. International law permits even
those states with no nexus to the offense to prosecute pirates, but
states are releasing the pirates they capture instead of prosecuting
them. They are doing so in part because of the difficulties associated
with obtaining evidence from witnesses who are often foreigners
beyond the state's subpoena power. The proposed rule offers at least a
partial solution to the culture of impunity that currently surrounds
piracy. It suggests a less burdensome and less costly way to ensure
that states can obtain the necessary evidence to prosecute maritime
piracy cases, while at the same time protecting the public's and the
defendant's interests in ensuring that trials are conducted in a fair
and just manner.

home/court-to-allow-video-link-testimony-in-bashir-trial/427957 (noting that a court in
India approved a request to permit sixteen witnesses to testify from a remote location
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286.
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287.
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Prosecute Pirates, REUTERS (May 25, 2011, 3:52 PM), http://af.reuters.comlarticle/
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court and prison facilities in both countries. See, e.g., FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
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